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In Luce Tua 
A Separate Peace 
A "People's Peace Treaty" has lately begun circu-
lating in the country. The treaty is a document which in-
dividuals and groups are signing in order to express 
their desire for an end to hostilities in Southeast Asia. 
The treaty is sponsored by a number of student groups 
in the United States, South Vietnam, and North Viet-
nam. The intent of these groups is to urge, or to force, 
the leaders of those countries to respond to their con-
stituents' apparently overwhelming preference for a 
rapid end to the Vietnam war. A declaration of peace 
among men of good will, it is thought, will hasten a pub-
lic declaration of peace by politicians. 
This novel strategem is immensely interesting. 
Whether or not it succeeds in its goal, the very idea of a 
People's Peace Treaty suggests an important shift in 
democratic theory. Far from being simply a new ploy in 
the anti-war organizations' resurgent campaign, the 
treaty signals a major extension in the theory of Par-
ticipatory Democracy. 
The rhetoric of Participatory Democracy has had 
largely to do with increasing the involvement of citizens 
in the administration of governmental programs which 
most directly affect them. Though even Mr. Nixon has 
spoken rather grandly about returning some "power to 
the people," it would seem that the power he speaks of 
is less the power to determine national policy than it is 
power to help implement national policy. No significant 
structural changes in governmental operations have, to 
my knowledge, been contemplated, nor have any very 
sweeping changes been demanded, except, of course, by 
self-styled revolutionary groups. Yet the People's Peace 
Treaty certainly suggests some radical alterations in the 
political power structure. It appears to be the last word 
in Participatory Democracy: it implies that the people 
themselves should rule, even (or especially) in matters 
of war and peace. 
So far as I can tell , democracy in this country has 
never involved rule by the people. It involves govern-
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Comment on Current Issues 
ment of everyone by some of us for the general good, 
authorized by a majority of voting citizens - to which 
majoritarian plan we all of us presumably at one time 
consented. But in this scheme, there are two radical 
limitations on self-government: majority rule, and 
delegated leadership. The people, in our democracy, do 
not rule themselves; nor does the majority rule the 
minority. Persons elected by the majority rule all the 
people. And the particular policies pursued by these 
leaders are largely Uetermined by what the leaders think 
best for the people. 
It should be stressed at this point that we voters sel-
dom vote on issues. There is an occasional local referen-
dum or bond issue on the ballot, to be sure, but by and 
large the label next to the lever in the voting booth 
contains a name. We vote for persons. Some of those 
persons represent us, as they say, in the discharge of 
their prescribed duties. Others - most notably the 
President of the United States and the Vice-President of 
the United States - serve no representative function at 
all. We elect them to rule for four years. Their powers 
are not, of course, absolute; we are not in the business 
of electing dictators. But their powers are very substan-
tial - particularly, as things have gone in recent years, 
in the area of foreign affairs. We elect people to set our 
foreign and domestic policies. 
When Nixon propounds a Doctrine (bearing his 
name) to the rest of the world he does so on the author-
ity of the majority of the citizens who voted in the last 
election. Yet no majority of our citizens was consulted 
in the formulation of that Doctrine. Nor did we have a 
chance to ratify it prior to promulgation. We don't, in 
fact, even have a chance to officially address ourselves 
to it until the next occasion arises to vote for a Presi-
dent. At which time, of course, we will not be voting on 
the Nixon Doctrine. We will be voting for, or against, 
Nixon. Hopefully our decision will be made on the basis 
of what, on balance, Nixon has or has not done - of 
which the Nixon Doctrine will be but a (very small) 
part. Indeed, by the time of the 1972 election, the chan-
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ces are very great that few of us will even ponder the 
merits of the Nixon Doctrine prior to casting our votes. 
I am emphasizing the fact that in our democracy we 
lend, by the vote, our corporate authority to our tulers; 
we furnish them with the moral power to rule. The Peo-
ple's Peace Treaty, however, suggests that Nixon does 
not rule; it suggests that we rule - ourselves, our coun-
try, each other. Thus the treaty can be seen as represent-
ing an attempt to put political as well as moral power 
back into the hands of the people - the powers to rule, 
directly. It is, to that extent, fundamentally at variance 
with American democratic principles. 
I should mention, before going further, that this 
analysis will not, in my estimation, furnish grounds 
either to sign or to spurn the treaty. What I am saying 
about the treaty is not that its sponsors are trying to slip 
past a war-weary electorate an instrument which would 
undermine the foundations of our democracy; still less 
am I saying that the intention behind the treaty just 
is to undermine the democracy. On the contrary, I take 
the motivation of the treaty's sponsors to be altogether 
honorable. Butevenifthe motivation weren't honorable, 
it seems to me that signing the treaty may very well be 
a proper action for a responsible citizen to take. I say 
this because massive support of the treaty will have, at 
best, symbolic effect. The most it can accomplish is the 
certification of public opinion; in that sense, signing the 
treaty is much like signing your name to an opinion 
poll. If this act has any political consequences at all, 
the consequences will be similar to any dramatic demon-
stration of public opinion on the war. 
Nevertheless, the sort of technique being employed 
in this instance to express public opinion is not without 
significance in its own right - especially when we see 
it in relation to other recent proposals for citizen in-
volvement in policy formation. One such idea would 
have voters register their preference on issues by means 
of a device attached to their television sets. There would 
be debates on the issue, and following the presentation 
of two or more alternatives the viewer would be asked to 
register his position. Once again, it is far from clear that 
this vote would have any binding force on the people's 
representatives or on the President. But it is not un-
reasonable to suppose that 'f such techniques were per-
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fected, there could well arise substantial sentiment in 
favor of the results of the vote being binding on the na-
tion's leadership. 
The point is that under such a system, the people 
themselves would bear direct responsibility for political 
decision-making. Some limitation of the available policy 
alternatives would perhaps still have to be provided by 
elected political leaders, but their chief function would 
change dramatically from policy determination to pol-
icy administration. 
The idea of a People's Peace Treaty hints at some 
such change in leadership roles on the part of our repre-
sentatives and the Chief Executive. The proposed treaty 
is a move designed to make political leaders more re-
sponsive to the will of the electorate on a specific issue. 
An extension of the idea would bind political leaders to 
decisions of State made by the electorate itself, directly 
expressed by majority vote on a given issue. This ver-
sion of Participatory Democracy, I am saying, is radical-
ly different from the current form of government. 
The question now arises as to whether such a revision 
of political organization has anything much to recom-
ment it. In boldest outline, the question comes down to 
whether it is preferable to choose one person, or one 
group of persons, to make your political decisions for 
you, or to rely directly on the decision-making ability 
of a majority of your countrymen. 
There is little reason to trust the wisdom of the Amer-
ican people in selecting their political leaders. What 
accounts for the acceptable level of leadership so far in 
evidence in our history is not, I think, the sagacity of 
the electorate. It is, rather, the immense complexity of 
the "political system" itself. The sifting and winnowing 
process a Presidential candidate must undergo is, for 
example, perhaps as good a guarantee of quality in the 
final product as any guarantee might be. When, at four-
year intervals, the American people are offered a choice 
between two persons, each of whom has made it to the 
top of his political ladder, the "choice" available to the 
people is already radically foreshortened. But if this 
system offers no very interesting alternatives when it 
comes to election day, it at least ensures that both al-





ternatives are pretty safe. No matter how badly the peo-
ple vote, they won't be able to hurt themselves much. 
The replacement of this imperfect but solid method of 
political organization with any system that offers possi-
bilities of perfection but which threatens to undermine 
solidity should give all of us cause for reflection. The 
People's Peace Treaty in fact will accomplish no such 
drastic change in the method of decision-making in our l 
democracy, even if everyone in the country signs it. But 
the suggestion it contains - that of bypassing the normal 
channels of political rule - is worth pondering. It is 
sad that this suggestion should ever have arisen, for the 
fact that it has arisen indicates how unresponsive our 
leaders have been to the will of the people in their charge. 
Thus it is not unreasonable to argue that it is the leaders 
themselves who are responsible for the development of 
maneuvers (even if they are largely symbolic maneuvers) 
which would strip them of their moral and political 
powers. 
The People's Peace Treaty is not a subversive docu-
ment in fact. It is, however, subversive in theory. That 
is because it is truly democratic in theory, whereas our 
present form of government is not. And however good 
pure democracy might sound in theory, one needs to 
consider how appealing it would be in fact. I, for one, 
have my doubts about it. But then, I have doubts about 
most everything. 
On Second Thought By ROBERT J. HOYER 
We ordered a pitcher of beer for the four of us at a 
pizza parlor. The proprietor looked at my wife and 
asked, "Is this young lady over 21 ?" The pressures of 
our culture are such that she was immensely flattered, 
and I was pleased with her. We should have been in-
sulted. 
I have seen fifty-two summers come and go, and I 
am glad for every one of them. Why should I want to 
be mistaken for what I was when I was twenty-one? 
Insecure, brash, afraid and self-assertive, trying to cover 
up my lack of knowledge with a show of certainty. Sure 
that I had the answers to rebuild the world, but knowing 
beneath the sureness that life couldn't be that simple 
or someone else would have rebuilt it long ago. Wor-
ried and anxious as though my God were grading me 
and I would not pass. 
I am much happier today than I was thirty years ago. 
I have far less responsibility than I had then, because 
I assume less. I have learned that there are many wiser 
men than I, many better men than I, and that together 
we are not really going to change very much in this 
God-visited planet. I have learned how to adapt to the 
stupidities and angers of other men because I have seen 
my own stupidities and angers for thirty years, and I · 
have watched my world adapt to them, forgive them, 
and ignore them. 
When I was twenty-one, I knew the meaning of grace. 
It was a doctrine entirely reasonable, that fit with per-
fect clarity into a body of truth about men. The whole 
system had been carefully taught to me, and my grades 
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in the learning process had been reasonably high. It 
never occurred to me that the system was being taught 
by older men, who were trying in the futile way of men 
to transmit wisdom across a generation gap to one who 
did not yet know the meaning of truth. 
I have learned a little since. I now know at least this 
much, that truth cannot be put into a book, however 
true the book might be. I have learned that grace is 
not a doctrine that fits logically into other doctrines. 
I am beginning to see that grace is the way to live among 
my fellowmen, following my Lord Jesus who is the 
Truth. I can say that the Bible is the source and norm 
of teaching, but it is awe before the Lord that is the be-
ginning of wisdom. 
I do not want to be twenty-one. I do not want to be 
mistaken for twenty-one. I do not envy anyone who is 
still twenty-one. When I was twenty-one I thought 
everything had to be right and true. Now I can hope 
that it will be forgiven and accepted. I can even accept 
the shame that it has taken me these thirty years to begin 
to learn and to believe. 
It just may be that one of the things we still must do 
to save the world is to honor again the aged man, as our 
God so well reminds us. Not the fifty-two-year-olds -
we are just kindergartners in wisdom. Not the aged men 
who yearn for youth, who believe the young can save 
them. Honor the aged men who know that the worship 
of youth is false, who realize that age has brought them 
wisdom, who have adapted to the folly of man in the 
grace of gur Lord Jesus Christ. 
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America the Beleaguered 
By JAMES A. NUECHTERLEIN 
Assistant Professor of History 
Queens University 
Kingston, Ontario 
We are endlessly reminded these days that the only 
solutions for our problems are radical ones, since it is 
by definition only radicals who can go to "the roots " of 
our difficulties. There is some sense in this (who can 
deny that it is necessary to attack problems at their base?) 
but difficulty arises in that the term "radical " has cus-
tomarily been reserved for the extremes of the political 
spectrum, particularly the extreme left. Since it is some-
thing less than a self-evident truth that fundamental 
analysis and prescription is conceivable only from the 
outer boundaries of political discourse, it should be pos-
sible to redeem "radical" from its normal connotation 
of extreme left or right and attempt in its name an anal-
y sis of our discontents that begins and ends somewhere 
in the political center. Thus the sub-title of this piece 
below and thus the following diagnosis of current politi-
cal pathology. 
The View from the Radical Center 
What follows is directed almost exclusively against 
the left. This should not be understood either as an 
implicit endorsement of the far right (by which I mean 
roughly that body of political opinion beginning with, 
say, Barry Goldwater and proceeding onward and down-
ward to George Wallace, Robert Welch, the Minutemen 
and other insanities) or as an underestimation of the 
right's potential political weight and danger. What is 
attempted here is analysis of political thought, and the 
simple fact is that serious political discussion in Amer-
ica (though not political influence) has been and still is 
confined largely to the left, William F. Buckley, Jr . and 
his little band of brothers at National Review to the 
contrary notwithstanding. This is, one can believe, un-
fortunate, since it limits the range and richness of our 
ideological options, but it remains a fact. It is an ex-
traordinarily rare occurrence, for example, for a truly 
conservative position to have any influence whatever 
in university and other intellectual circles. Political 
conservatism as an electoral reality is alive and well 
in America but as an ideology it remains the "thankless 
persuasion" that Clinton Rossiter so aptly described 
some time ago. For this reason, then, this view from the 
center aims its attention at the left. 
And the view is alarming. What we face, in broadest 
terms, is the old romanticism of the new left. From that 
perspective, the description of our ills is well-nigh over-
whelming. Things, we are told, are in a terrible, even 
intolerable, state. America is rotten. Instead of a society 
based on peace, brotherhood and abundance, we see in-
stead the perpetuation of war, racism and pove;ty. The 
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System (or the Establishment or the Power Structure) 
has failed. At best it can be given One Last Chance be-
fore whatever it is that looms beyond despair and into 
the apocalypse brings the nation to its rightful doom. 
We face , at the least, widespread "trashing" and, at the 
most, full-scale revolution. The prospects for ultimate 
salvation are slim: a society resting precariously on a 
selfish materialism has but a remote hope that somehow 
a saving remnant composed of the young, the poor and 
the black (and perhaps a few middleclass intellectuals) 
might redeem its political soul. 
The political style accompanying all this is entirely 
appropriate to the analysis. The new politics of con-
science, having consigned the old politics of compro-
mise to moral outer darkness, confronts us with the non-
negotiable demand as the standard opening item of 
political discourse, and any suggestion that such a de-
mand might be non-fulfillable as well is greeted by the 
protesters' most prized weapon: moral outrage. It is this 
capacity for sustained indignation that seems most ad-
mired by friends of the new politics. The point to be 
emphasized about the young activists , we are regularly 
reminded, is that above all they care ; the fact that their 
caring so frequently takes such strident and violent 
forms is supposedly a proof of both the desperateness of 
our plight and the depth of their concern, and should 
in any case not prevent us from recognizing and ap-
plauding the high moral purpose that is the hallmark 
of the love generation. Sincerity and idealism cover , 
apparently, a multitude of sins. 
But why, as the kids would say, get so uptight about 
it all? Haven't the young always been idealistic, and 
often (at least to older eyes) unreasonably so? Isn't this 
the prerogative of youth? Do we really want a genera-
tion of young old men, prematurely wise, compromising 
their moral ideals before they have even been tested? 
So young people lack balance and judgment - so what 
else is new? 
What is new, first of all, is the incredible seriousness 
with which this generation is taken in its political and 
moral pronouncements. We not only listen with rapt 
attention to the post-adolescent temper tantrums of 
our Mark Rudds or Mario Savios or whoever, we nod in 
sad and penitent agreement at their scornful rejection 
of everything their elders have done, sought and 
dreamed. Even if the young sometimes exaggerate, it 
is said, even if their denunciations display neither dis-
crimination, charity or wit, they must not only be heard, 
they must be heeded; we must, above all, Listen to What 




If it is true that young people have always been ideal-
istic, it is also true that their innocent vision of what 
society should be has never before in American history 
been taken as a serious norm against which present 
reality is properly judged. 
More important than the seriousness with which the 
judgments of the activist youth are taken is the extent to 
which middle-aged liberals have adopted the youthful 
stance of moral absolutism, with all its consequences. 
Wholesale rejection of American civilization, easy ac-
ceptance of violence and loose talk of revolution are not 
restricted to underground newspapers; one can readily 
find similar attitudes expressed in the pages of respected 
journals like the old left Nation or the indefatigably 
cerebral New York Review of Books. (Radical chic re-
cently infested fashionable literary and academic society 
to an extent inconceivable a few short years ago.) Last 
month's political madness becomes this week's advanced 
opinion and will likely be tomorrow's received wisdom. 
What has been lost sight of among the young (of all 
ages) on the far left has been any reasonable reckoning 
of what politics is and is not, of what it can and cannot 
do. Perhaps most basic to this is a very simple but re-
markably pervasive social fallacy: if there is a discern-
ible problem, there must be a feasible solution. Out of 
this grows the belief that if only we really wanted to, we 
could obliterate from our society the evils that plague us . 
Aggression, prejudice and injustice are not, in this view, 
among the terrible concommitants of human frailty; 
they are instead historical and moral anachronisms no 
longer tolerable in an Aquarian age. 
What if the Intolerable is Unavoidable? 
Underlying this illusion is the implicit assumption 
that the natural state of man in society is devoid, or at 
least nearly so, of suffering and conflict. If in fact, then, 
things like aggression, prejudice and injustice perse-
vere, they do so either because of particular evil men or 
because of a generally evil system. Such a presupposi-
tion is necessary to the very conception that, if we 
wished, we could rid ourselves of major social problems; 
the claim that the current state of affairs is intolerable 
makes sense only on the assumption that it is avoidable. 
It is probably this assumption that best explains the 
otherwise surprising inability of so many liberals to 
answer effectively the charges and demands of the ex-
treme left. The virtually masochistic acceptance on 
college campuses and elsewhere of the most outrageous 
demands and actions from militants of whatever color 
or age makes sense only when one understands the bur-
den of guilt under which many middle-class liberals 
operate. They cannot effectively respond to moral out-
rage because they substantially accept the indictment 
offered against their generation, and they do so because 
they basically agree that injustice, privation and all the 
rest are intolerable and/or avoidable. And so they all 
too readily admit that We Have Failed and We Are All 
Guilty. 
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The point being argued here, of course, is not that 
all social problems are insoluble. We are not mere help-
less victims of a capricious universe. But we must dis-
tinguish carefully between the things we can and cannot 
accomplish. We must know the difference between mi-
nor problems that can be solved relatively easily and 
quickly, major problems that might allow of solution in 
the long range but are capable in the short-run only of 
amelioration, and the eternal problems that lie beyond 
institutional or other arrangements and that inhere in 
the conditions of our humanity. Thus, for example, 
while racial discrimination embodied in law can, with 
effort, be ended quickly, and general prejudice against 
Blacks, or at least its social effects, can probably be vir-
tually eliminated over a course of decades (though not 
over any much briefer time span), the elements of fear, 
arrogance and hatred that initially produce any specific 
discrimination are embedded in human nature and are 
not, at least on the evidence to date, subject to substan-
tial alteration. In brief, while we can solve some prob-
lems quickly and can gradually reduce the negative so-
cial effects of others, we cannot produce a society in 
which souls are greened and unselfish love abounds. 
Only when it is again recognized that conflict is the 
natural state of things in social relations can we return to 
a politics of realism. Disagreements among individuals 
and interest groups are natural and legitimate, and 
these differences produce real complexities and real 
pain; politics is not most of the time on most issues best 
understood as a morality play. Demands on men and in-
stitutions that, in effect, depend on transcendence of 
human limitations for their fulfillment are evidence not 
of higher sensibility but of social irresponsibility. That 
a man makes "idealistic" or "moral" protests against 
things as they are does not, contrary to much current 
wisdom, absolve him of the responsibility of showing, at 
the least, that available alternatives exist. In the end, 
and however venerable the cliche, a responsible poli-
tics must remain the art of the possible. 
It is perhaps necessary to remind ourselves again 
that democracy is a process, and not a set of policy pre-
scriptions. Men of good will can and do disagree on 
major issues, and the assumption of one side in a policy 
dispute that its moral superiority frees it from the im-
plications of majority rule is destructive of democratic 
society. The minority has the right to be heard; it does 
not have the right to insist that its demands be met. 
There are times, of course, when a decent man finds 
that he cannot in conscience abide by the majority de-
cision, but surely the occasions that require active civil 
disobedience are not nearly so numerous as current 
rhetoric and practice would indicate. The bonds of the 
social compact are surprisingly fragile, as we are cur-
rently discovering, and a deliberate action to weaken 
them is justifiable only in the most extreme circum-
stance. 
It is at this point that we approach the heart of our 
current differences, for those whose rhetoric and action 
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are here under attack would claim that our circumstan-
ces are extreme, that our current psychological malaise 
results from the failure of the political system to solve 
or even effectively to tackle the very real social, eco-
nomic and moral issues that confront us. That our prob-
lems are serious is of course beyond reasonable argu-
ment; it is the extent (and precise nature) of the crisis 
that is under debate, along with the problem of how best 
to respond to it. We face the extraordinarily difficult 
problem of attempting to define what is or is not a toler-
able state of affairs in society. 
We can begin most easily in the negative: a society 
without order is not tolerable. One had always imagined 
that this proposition was in the nature of a universally 
acknowledged first principle, but the frighteningly 
widespread acceptance among us of violence as a politi-
cal weapon suggests that even first principles require 
occasional restatement and reaffirmation. It is not so 
much that any except political crazies come out in favor 
of violence, but that all sorts of people who should know 
better either explain it away ("Of course one can't 
approve of violence, but what would you do if you were 
(check one] black, poor, young, alienated, outraged, 
etc.") or else condemn it on purely tactical grounds 
("Violence is bad because it brings out the blackshirts"). 
That necessary point being made, it doesn't take us 
very far, since, as is so frequently noted, nations like 
Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union have created orderly 
societies that most of us would not find particularly 
tolerable. 
God is not Alive and Well as Politics 
To approach the problem of definition in a positive 
way requires adopting both a comparative and a histor-
ical perspective. It does not make much sense to say that 
America is rotten unless one means by that that it is 
rotten compared ·either to other existing societies or to 
its own past. Any other approach involves insuperable 
difficulties. If we argue, for example, that a tolerable 
America requires a higher level of moral performance 
than would apply to other societies we are guilty of per-
petuating the old myth of American superiority; there 
isn't, after all, much difference between "America is 
the greatest nation that ever was" and "America should 
(or must) be the greatest nation that ever was." Or, if 
we judge America against some abstract standard of our 
own making, then we are simply involved in easy mor-
alizing, "easy" because our judgments are answerable 
not to standards of reality but to whatever theoretical 
norm we wish to create. 
One must be very careful here. The argument is not 
that citizens of any nation should ever refrain from try-
ing to improve the moral workings of their society; it is 
the quite distinct point that judgments concerning the 
moral performance of any nation at any time cannot 
reasonably be made in isolation. There are dangers of 
parochialism for the critics as well as the boosters of 
American society. 
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All this does not, of course, provide us with a specific 
yardstick for measuring the performance of the Ameri-
can nation, but it does perhaps suggest some guidelines 
within which individual citizens can make their own 
measurements. Such guidelines are important in arriv-
ing at judgments that neither sell our potentialities 
short nor make demands that exceed the limits of the 
possible. It is the latter danger that seems clear and 
present at this time; there are certainly Americans that 
are complacent today, but America as a society almost 
as certainly is not. 
The charge of complacency is not unfamiliar to those 
of us who came to maturity in the 1950's. Applied to the 
public political discourse and policy of the time, the 
charge is not inaccurate, but as a characterization of the 
political thought of the period it is inadequate. The best 
thinkers of the decade were engaged not in some mind-
less American celebration, as is often charged, but in a 
rethinking of the American experience that attempted 
to add depth and rigor to the often soft liberal ortho-
doxies of the Thirties and Forties. In the process they 
came to discard many of the old progressive political 
dualisms (the oppressors vs. the oppressed, the inter-
ests vs. the people) in favor of new categories that, they 
thought, more fully captured historical reality. The 
characteristic social analysts of the time emphasized 
complexity, ambiguity, paradox, irony, mystery, trag-
edy. In so doing, they necessarily sacrificed the cer-
tainties of the Manichean persuasion; they were less 
assured than were their precedessors or their successors 
precisely who were the villains and who the heroes in 
any given social situation. 
Perhaps they went too far in that direction, perhaps 
too easily or too often an awareness of complexity be-
came an excuse for inaction; certainly each political 
generation, having its own special virtues, has perforce 
its own special weaknesses. But whatever their limita-
tions, they understood better than can our current radi-
cals the ambiguities and pitfalls of the moral life. In 
that understanding they assiduously avoided the ter-
rible simplicities of broad moral judgments, especially 
as applied to peoples and nations. We might do well to 
cultivate their virtues. 
Maybe we could begin by avoiding nonsensical pro-
nouncements that prove America's failure by compar-
ing her highest ideals with her actual accomplishments, 
or that seize upon every crisis to predict the imminent 
collapse of the social system. The primary issue here 
is not fairness, or even intellectual and moral clarity, 
but rather the costs to public morale that such prophe-
cies and imprecations cumulatively generate. If John 
Lindsay tells us often enough that we are in the midst 
of a kind of collective nervous breakdown that threatens 
the foundations of the nation it is entirely possible that 
in time the prophecy will indeed self-fulfill, especially 
if it is accompanied by similar declarations from dozens 
of other public figures whose basic message is that 
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America is deservedly destroying itself through mas-
sive moral collapse. 
An "idealism" that consistently demands what cannot 
be delivered and that regularly arouses expectations 
that cannot be met eventually takes an awful toll in 
public frustration, bitterness and loss of comity. To 
demand a politics that approaches purity is, in the end, 
not really moral at all; it is actually the ultimate abdica-
tion. The beginning of social wisdom is the acknow-
ledgement that there are no New Jerusalems. 
One final point. It is increasingly evident that many 
of the rhetorical and other excesses of political America 
derive from the intolerable burden we too often place 
upon political life. It might be well for us to reassert 
the ultimate primacy of the private realm over the pub-
lic, or at least to avoid confusing the two. Politics can 
serve public needs, but it can do little to repair damaged 
psyches or reduce existential anguish. The personal 
demons that dwell in us all will not be exorcised by 
collective political cleansing. Whether or not we believe 
that God is dead, we should at least know where not to 
look for Him. To transcendentalize politics trivializes 
religion and poisons public affairs; it robs the religious 
of ultimate spiritual consolation and injects into public 
life absolute values that make the democratic process 
unworkable. In the end, our deepest personal needs 
and aspirations lie beyond the public arena, beyond the 
effects for good or for evil of particular political and 
economic arrangements. 
The foregoing analysis implies no preferred position 
on the political spectrum within the limits of the possi-
ble; it simply supposes that those limits exist and that 
we ignore them at our peril. It would be both absurd and 
pretentious to prescribe a specific program for the poli-
tical recovery of America; that men of good will and 
intelligence can disagree about these things has been 
one of the central arguments of this essay. One suspects 
that it is no great revelation that our political hope lies 
somewhere in the political center and that the far funny 
left has little of value to offer us, but perhaps it can be 
offered as a necessary, if modest, beginning to the re-
storation of civility and sanity in the politics of the 
Republic. 
Church Music in a Pluralistic Society 
By HEINZ WERNER ZIMMERMANN 
Director of the Berlin School of Sacred Music 
West Berlin, Germany 
What can the gospel and music do for each other? 
What can they do for each other today? 
We may also ask, "What can the gospel do for music?" 
This part of the question is seldom heard. Much more 
often we hear the question, "What can music do for the 
gospel, for the divine service, for the church?" 
The most pat answer and probably also the most fre-
quent is: "Music should bring people to church so that 
they can hear the gospel." Everybody answering like 
this makes music a means to an end with no essential 
value in itself. The loss of church music would not be 
lamented by him if the desired goal of increasing church 
attendance could be more cheaply achieved by the pro-
vision of free beer. People who think this way are not 
particularly musical. Any kind of music will do, good or 
bad, for the divine service so long as it increases church 
attendance. A little while ago Gregorian was the thing; 
now it is rock; tomorrow electronic music. Discrimina-
tion is not called for; the best church music is that 
which happens at the moment to get the most people 
off their bottoms. 
If this were all that music can do for the gospel we 
would never have the incalculable treasure of church 
music which is our heritage and which still continues to 
grow. If music had been used only as a lure in the divine 
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services of the past none of the forms of church music 
would have arisen, neither hymnody nor chorale works, 
nor motets, nor cantatas, nor oratorios. 
What else is there that music can do for the Gospel? 
In our search for an answer there are two examples 
that show what church music has been capable of. In the 
sixteenth century an astonished Jesuit observed that 
Luther had won more souls for the Reformation with 
his hymns than with his theology. And in the nineteenth 
century an avowed enemy of Christianity, Friederich 
Nietzsche, once confessed that a hearing of Bach's St. 
Matthew Passion had power to almost win him over 
again to Christianity. 
Here plainly church music was more than mere tick-
ling of ears or merchandising gimmicks; here, music 
is a witness for the gospel. Here, in Luther and in Bach, 
it was the gospel which first did something for music. 
All that music has done for the gospel - and that is not 
something small - is here too so that we can perceive 
and clearly feel what the gospel has first done for music. 
Here, as in all authentic church music, we have music 
which expresses its having been taken hold of by the 
gospel. 
What gain does the gospel have from such musical ex-
pression of the way of the gospel? 
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The gospel receives another dimension of persuasive 
power. When a preacher strives to bring the gospel 
home to his hearers, he not only uses logic but he also 
gives expression to his having been taken hold of by the 
gospel and to his being caught up in it. So also church 
music carries the gospel further than its systematic ex-
plication. In church music the gospel shows that it can 
so fill the whole existence of a man that the man cannot 
but "sing and tell" of it. 
Already in the oldest forms of church music we find 
this exultant elevation. In the single voiced melodies of 
Gregorian we clearly hear an exuberance in its way of 
speaking. Speaking has taken wings. The natural rhy-
thm of the speaking voice is only slightly modified and 
elevated by the chanting of the lines of melody. It is 
elevated, enlarged, and so can be taken in more clearly. 
The stirring power of words in a vital statement is taken 
up into the musical melody and therefore can be re-
peated. 
The next oldest form of church music, introduced by 
Ambrose, is the "hymnus" which expresses particularly 
in the texts this vibrant dimension of having been taken 
hold of by the gospel. This form of the "hymnus" gives 
the congregation the possibility of speaking together in 
a way that lifts them all up together. Here exultation 
calls for a short melody, simply constructed, so that 
every member of the congregation can join in the sing-
ing. 
However, since the fifteenth century and since the 
polyphonic masters of the Low Countries, church music 
has aspired to and achieved even more. It aspired to be 
a musical image of God's creation. In the Middle Ages 
music, as one of the liberal arts, kept company with 
mathematics and astronomy. Each voice of the poly-
phony moved according to strict rules recalling the 
planets in their courses and the beauty of the harmonia 
mundi, the music of the world. 
Between Josquin and Schuetz this musical cosmos was 
brought down to earth. The single voices of the poly-
phony take on the character of men's voices and follow 
the tone and accent of the spoken language. The musical 
harmonia mundi becomes the musical expression of the 
Christian congregation in which each individual mem-
ber has his role in singing the praise of God. 
Further developments of church music were evoked 
as the individual instruments of instrumental music 
came into their own in the seventeenth century and as 
dance music pattems were taken into church music. 
New forms were introduced. Buxtehude's church con-
certs brought into church music modem musical metres 
and rhythms as also Bach's cantatas brought in modem 
dance forms. However, they do not push into church 
music as foreign bodies, or as a sort of intermezzo relief. 
They are fully integrated and are brought into the ser-
vice only when they give musical expression to the 
sacred text. 
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Bach's synthesis of vocal music that speaks and in-
strumental music that dances brought forward the vocal 
music that could speak to dance, and the instrumental 
music that could dance to speaking. We are here at the 
beginning of the classical period of music which grows 
out of the synthesis of religious and secular music -
individual expression within the framework of a collec-
tive scheme. 
We find his same synthesis of religious and secular 
music in the Viennese classical composers: Hayden, 
Mozart and Beethoven. 
Toward a Heterogeneous Polyphony 
Then, strangely, in the nineteenth century this synth-
esis is taken apart and we have again a schism between 
expressive music and dance music. For this schism in 
Germany today we use the terms E-Mus,·k (ernste mu-
sik, serious music) and U-Musik (unterhaltungsmusik , 
entertainment music). In The Magt"c Flute, Mozart 
could write music expressive of Sarastro and Papageno. 
Scarcely a hundred years later the worlds symbolized 
by Sarastro and Papageno had become so uncombinable 
that each needed its own composer and its own opera. 
As Thrasboulos Georgiades points out, The Magic 
Flute falls apart into Parsifal and Die Fledermaus. 
However, the schism between serious music and en-
tertainment music is nowadays not the only one. In the 
last hundred years another splitting has occurred. We 
separate the different styles in the history of music. We 
have leamed to keep them apart from contemporary 
music which we have even leamed to push to the wall . 
A hundred years ago. music was contemporary music, 
and it cost considerable effort to keep Mozart's great 
works from oblivion, and even to make Bach's master-
pieces known at all. Today we have the opposite. The 
master musicians of our day find small room for their 
works on concert programs beside the masterpieces of 
the past. 
Music today is a plurality of different voices each 
claiming its rights. With which of these languages shall 
church music speak? Should it be Bach's way? For many 
this is the ideal for church music. Should it be Pales-
trina's way, or that of the Beatles, or that of the avant 
garde? All these are possible. 
An organist in his improvisation can give authentic 
expression to his being taken hold of by the gospel in 
the style of Bach, which may be called an organist's 
mother tongue. Mahalia Jackson expresses the way she 
has been taken hold of in a style we would say belongs 
to entertainment music. Anton Weber in the style of 
avant garde. In our day faith's music can be of many 
different kinds. 
Yet in our day it might again be the way of the gospel 
to perform the work of musical reconciliation. Perhaps 
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the gospel will help us to unite to God's praise in the 
very different tongues which sound out in our musical 
pluralism. Such a reconciliation could not be by force or 
suppression, but it could be by means of a new poly-
phony which acknowledges the individuality of each 
voice and yet leads them together into a higher poly-
stylistic wholeness. 
The pluralism of our musical styles, which is a coun-
terpart to the pluralism of our time, is a loss as long as 
the different styles stand off from one another and wage 
war without understanding. It is abundance, however, 
as soon as the different styles are brought together in 
polyphonic reconciliation. 
What could be done for the gospel by such pluralistic 
polyphony? We retum to where we began. 
The gospel would have this: a witness that it is also 
able to work powerfully in the chaos of our contem-
porary music, working a lively work of reconciliation. 
Church music that reconciles in itself the heterogeneous 
styles of our time would add vi tal cogency to the church in 
her proclamation of reconciliation. Church music would 
show prophetically in such a work of art what the gospel 
would do for the whole world. 
And what boon would there be from such church mu-
sic for the individual member of the Christian congre-
gation? 
We must first reject the folly of supposing that we can 
ever achieve again one unified modem style for church 
music. All that we have musically inherited cannot be 
thrown into oblivion. We shall continue to live with the 
great works from the past. The music of the past is in 
our musical blood. In the church also we shall continue 
to live the great works of the past. We shall not throw 
them aside in closed-minded iconoclasm. With all our 
efforts to create new songs for the church we shall con-
tinue to sing the old hymns. With all our efforts to create 
new music for organ and choir for divine worship we 
shall continue to hear the works of those masters who 
have gone before us. We shall creatively carry forward 
that tradition in our worship and not abolish it. 
Whoever dreams up a divine service with music and 
liturgy tailored exclusively to the "here and now" falls 
behind our contemporary awareness of pluralism which 
cannot be squashed into a narrow "here and now." This 
criticism fits many of the "contemporary services" 
which are so much applauded nowadays. They would 
become a danger for the church if they were used every 
Sunday. 
"Contemporary services" have a useful role to play a 
few times in the year and can be helpful toward an ex-
panded understanding of the many, different forms of 
expression in our day. They can also help the individ-
ual member of the congregation to make his way through 
this multiplicity. Every stylistic one-sidedness should 
be avoided. Here, in such services, should be the place 
of great, pluralistic music for the church, reconciling 
in a new "heterogeneous polyphony" the different con-
temporary and historical idioms. 
The voice of the gospel within such a new polyphony 
would be one among the heterogeneous many, but this 
would reflect the way the church in our day is one voice 
among many and contrary voices. A polystylistic poly-
phony would bring home to the hearer that in the multi-
plicity of our modem world the gospel is the cantus 
firmus which reconciles those who are set against each 
other, and points them to the worship of God as the 
common goal of all men. 
What is Human about the Humanitiesl 
By ERIC DEAN 
Evans Professor of Religion 
Wabash College 
Crawfordsville, Indiana 
An ancient canard directed against the Sophists was 
that they took money for enabling men to "make the 
worse appear the better case." Certainly this objection 
to the Sophists must continue to give pause to all teach-
ers of speech. They are professionally committed to 
helping students improve their rhetoric whether those 
same students will be speaking on behalf of good or evil, 
the better or worse. Surely a rhetorician must occasion-
ally have been tempted, when confronted with a stu-
dent whose views he abhored, to teach him a few effec-
tive errors. "Be sure to talk down to you audience so 
that they may recognize you as an authority figure." A 
Sophist could possibly make such counsel sound fairly 
convincing. 
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Having thus twitted my colleagues in speech for years 
about their being Sophists under a newer guise, I was 
recently sobered to realize that my position is not so 
very different from theirs. I was in a seminar with some 
older men (their age is important; they had firm opin-
ions of their own), and we were discussing the death 
dialogues of Socrates. The question occurred to me: 
On the assumption that few of these men are going to 
conclude that this kind of philosophical dialogue just-
ifies civil disobedience, then what has been the point of 
the seminar? Of course, they leamed a bit about Soc-
rates and the nature of Athenian justice, but we had not 
made the assignment for the purpose of these bits of 
historical information. How might one justify an acti-
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vity from which there is really no hope of deriving 
consensus? 
And, of course, what is true of an individual seminar is 
true in spades of the whole project of liberal education. 
It is rather like the freshmen going back to his hill-
country shack and being asked, for the delectation of 
his relatives, to "say something college." 
Are teachers of the humanities in the business of 
casting pearls before swine - lecturing on the arcane 
mysteries of the inner workings of the Trinity to the 
young when they are more interested in their own 
plumbing and wiring? Are we in the business of help-
ing barbarians put on airs - teaching generations of 
profligate entrepreneurs to spell and write literately? 
Do we teach them contents? 
Do we teach them skills? 
Actually, of course, students do retain an occasional 
fact from their course work with us. My colleague in 
German, when we walk at night on campus, can point 
out Casseopeia's Chair and thus shows that his course in 
astronomy was not for naught. Too, it is obviously the 
case that students sometimes are more literate by dint 
of our efforts. But, as is trite to comment, a humanities 
faculty can take little satisfaction from a contents/skills 
justification of its teaching enterprise. 
A Countertype to the Humanities 
It is obvious that the salvation of the race does not 
come from increments of knowledge. While our style of 
life is more comfortable for all of the discoveries of the 
past generations, it is dubious whether the race is, in 
sum, happier or even more comfortable. We drive to 
our psychiatrist's office in ever more luxurious cars; 
and few Vietnamese are being killed by aerial bombard-
ment save at the hands of college graduates. 
This is, to repeat, trite. Of course, we have long since 
known that it is wisdom that men should seek, and that 
an educational system unaware of the difference between 
knowledge and wisdom is likely to be dehumanizing if 
not demonic. What we have never satisfactorily clari-
fied is how one may go about pursuing wisdom. It is 
the kind of dilemma to which Wittgenstein refers in the 
preface to his Tractatus. The first sentence reads, "Per-
haps this book will be understood only by someone who 
has himself already had the thoughts that are express-
ed in it - or at least similar thoughts." Or, as it is ex-
pressed in Plato's Meno, " ... if (a man) knows, he has no 
need to enquire; and if not, he cannot .... " It seems to 
follow that any wisdom a student may have developed 
through his undergraduate years is no proven function 
of what we did to him. Wise or foolish, he is wise and 
foolish on his own account. 
Rather like good manners or bad manners, the human-
ities can only be referred to in the plural, and one 
inclines to the view that almost any discipline may be 
included in their number. As I hope to indicate later, 
the sciences are not categorically excluded from the 
humanities in the sense here suggested. It will appear, 
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further , that the disciplines typically called the human-
ities may, for reasons I shall specify, be traduced so 
that they are not humanities in fact. 
For the sake of contrast, I should like to suggest a 
countertype to the humanities. So far as I know, there is 
only one discipline which is concerned to exemplify 
the countertype in any degree of purity, and even here 
the exemplification does not rule out the humanities 
quotient. The typology is that of a the tic discipline, and 
I think of its exemplification in logic or pure mathemat-
ics. The thetic discipline is one in which propositions 
appear, but in which they are manipulated in a purely 
formal fashion. Ever since Aristotle it has been recog-
nized that such a discipline is concerned with validity 
rather than truth. Not that this is cause for scandal. It 
is simply the case that there exists, and can exist, no 
formal test of truth. 
The logical proof properly so-called simply mani-
fests the validity of conclusions to be drawn from what-
ever premise may be assumed. The continual concern 
of the logician is for elegance - which suggests an 
aesthetic consideration, but this may simply be defined 
as the achievement of ever more primitive deductions. 
This is to say, one strives for ever shorter chains of argu-
ment leading to the desired valid conclusion. There is 
also the effort to obtain systems employing a minimum 
of logical operators. 
It would be foolish to deny the significance in respect 
of logic of interest and insight, but one's consuming pas-
sion for theorems and the ease with which one proceeds 
to new deductions has little bearing on the nature of 
the discipline per se. The test is for validity, an entirely 
formal notion, and, so far as logic is concerned, the moon 
may just as well be made of green cheese and Socrates 
be immortal. 
Logic is, as I have suggested, the pure type of the 
thetic discipline. So far as logic is concerned proposi-
tions need have no content; it is enough to know whether 
they shall be co~sidered true or false. The determina-
tion of truth or falsity is no part of logic. 
A major group of the non-humanities disciplines are 
less than purely thetic, but are treated, for the most 
part, as if they were thetic. In much the same way as 
one is inducted into the operations of logic, so is one 
inducted into the natural and even the social sciences. 
To be sure, there are genuine questions having to do 
with the evaluation of data and the development of new 
models. But where all but the growing edge of the 
disciplines are concerned, the field is to be regarded as 
a constellation of mutually defined concepts to be 
grasped as a whole. 
There is considerable charm to the notion that ex-
perience, like knowledge, is built up from primitive 
elements accumulated over time and subsequently or-
ganized into meaningful clusters. Notice how very long 
it was that the empiricists' primitivism went essentially 
unchallenged. Was it not written, as if in tablets of stone, 
that man received impressions - discrete impressions 
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of oolor, sensations of touch and texture - and that 
these, by a process of accumulation, became the exper-
ience of, say, a peach. There is now little debate that 
even the most primitive sensation is probably contex-
tual and that no one ever has these discrete experiences 
of patches of color. What is less frequently recognized, 
however, is that the concepts of science are themselves 
no less contextual. It is not, as the layman naively ima-
gines, that there are certain basic nubbins of matter 
which exist to be thought of in this way and that - as , 
say, by Newton and Einstein. Rather, the way in which 
matter is conceived depends on the nature of the model. 
There is, of course, a basic question concerning the 
nature and interpretation of evidence, but most of the 
work in science done by under-graduates is purely for-
mal and thetic. The average laboratory session is the 
scientist's counterpart of the Sunday School class - and 
about as effective. Despite all the talk about getting a 
feel for the material, the symbols on the page are the 
primary data; after all, they must be "handed in." 
It is the characteristic of what I wish to call thetic 
disciplines that the question of the adequacy of the 
symbol is raised either not at all , as in logic, or only on 
the periphery of the discipline as taught. As a student 
once commented: the picture of science as empirical 
generalization would lead to little scientific research of 
the standard variety. In other words, if I understood 
this student, while as Einstein must comprehend the in-
adequacies of any model, the average investigator is 
pretty much a fundamentalist where the symbols of 
his field are concerned. Further, I am suggesting, the 
tyro in the field is often little concerned for what the 
symbols purport to represent; for him it is a matter of 
learning to manipulate a totally formal system of con-
cepts. 
This totally formal system has enviable simplicity 
as respects teaching and learning, so much so that the 
humanities too are often transmuted into the simply 
thetic. In order to study poetry a student will learn 
about the life and thought of poets and the probable 
source of the poets' allusions. The student in religion 
will learn the creeds and their antidotes in chronologi-
cal series. These are obviously ways of studying poetry 
and theology, but they are falsifications of the concerns 
of poetry and theology. 
Do Not Think as a Thinker 
There is a long tradition, at least as old as the Sophists, 
which wants to suggest that the thetic, with its concern 
for formal unities, is a poor instrument for doing jus-
tice to the richness of human existence as it is exper-
ienced. Socrates and Plato could make logical hay out 
of the elliptical theses of the Sophists, but the doctrine 
of the forms was, for all its elegance, a pale figure of the 
material universe. A passion for unity might seem to 
justify the doctrine, but there was a never-ending ser-
ies of footnotes which needed to be added "to save ap-
pearances." Not that the recurrent systems are without 
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interest, even fascination, but they could only find the 
richness of human experience as a source of contradic-
tion, and thus preferred to regard experience as a cheat 
and a sham. Thus does human learning tend to become 
-as someone once described science: "The lie common-
ly agreed to." 
The tendency is centrifugal: to take the words about 
a situation as if they adequately expressed the situation 
and finally to regard them as the form of reality itself. 
Now, to quote Protagoras, "Don't quibble about my 
use of language, but try to understand what I mean." 
Of course, one can justify study of the humanities as 
disciplines in the way which one justifies mountain-
climbing; they exist to be conquered. Beyond this dis-
tortion of their value, however, the humanities exist 
to call attention to the human factor at the root of all 
humane education. The thetic elements of the humani-
ties so obviously cannot be justified in their own terms. 
Unlike logic and pure mathematics, and perhaps in 
spite of themselves, the thetic humanities point to that 
for whose sake they exist, from whose existence they 
derive their value. 
In all thetic disciplines the necessary criteria of dis-
course are necessarily regnant. Anyone who essays to 
speak meaningfully , for instance, must needs be 
governed by the principle of non-contradiction; it is not 
possible for a thing both to be and not to be in the same 
respect at the same time. From the point of view of dis-
course, this principle cannot be violated. Yet it seems to 
be the case that existential situations violate this prin-
ciple. Perhaps it would be better to say that a rule of 
language is not a rule of being; yet talking is so charac-
teristic a human activity that we have repeatedly taken 
grammar to be the constitutent law of the universe. Man 
needs to be freed from this bondage, but the problem is 
hardly to be overcome in the realm of formal discourse. 
One must attempt to follow Feuerbach's dictum: "Do 
not think as a thinker." 
The simplest human activity defies adequate descrip-
tion. Imagine, for example, instructing a person to de-
ploy his muscles in such a fashion as to write his own 
name. Itissimpleenough to say, "Write your own name." 
Imagine, then, the infinitely greater simplification in-
volved in giving a name to an emotional state. Presum-
ably it is sometimes useful to speak of a person's being 
in love. Yet even if all were willing to stipulate that the 
term was truly attributed to the individual, it would 
surely be improper to think that any further fact can be 
said to be entailed. "If he loves her, then .. . . "It has the 
form of a meaningful proposition, but is a remarkable 
oversimplification of any existential situation. 
tion. 
That theologians have for centuries been at the job 
of "cracking the axiom of reason" suggests that the task 
is hardly yet complete however simply it may be accom-
plished in the form of an argument. But, after all, human 
experience is not cumulative - as if each generation 
did not need to learn its own lessons. That the argument 
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is not obvious is sufficiently evident if one notes the 
obloquy heaped on David Hume for nigh on two hun-
dred years. "Why, he denies the existence of self while 
speaking of the self' - as if it were not sufficiently evi-
dent that Hume was not intending to deny the self's 
existence, but to direct our attention to the fact that the 
self is not founded in rationality. 
Given the peculiar insensitivity of the tradition to this 
crucial insight, we are fortunate whenever the humani-
ties have sufficed to remind us of the man who lives 
within all of the talk about man. Occasionally one of 
our students uses a metaphor instead of talking about 
metaphors and enriches his own existence and ours. 
Or he paints a picture or writes a line of music. The hu-
man in the humanities is precisely this pursuit. The 
counterpart is rather as if one attempted to discover the 
significance of a metaphor while convinced that all 
terms have only literal meanings. 
The problem is, how shall one follow the dictum, "Do 
not think as a thinker"? 
I propose that it is the very character of the humani-
ties to frustrate any continued attempt exhaustively to 
transmute the properly human into the convenient cate-
gories of formalized thought. This transmutation is 
done in infinitely many high school and college courses 
to the everlasting shame of the teaching profession, but 
yet, so I must argue, there is an integrity alike to man 
and the arts which will frustrate the continued attempt 
to make thetic what is essentially not formal. 
I said earlier that there is no formal criterion of truth. 
We do our students a rank injustice by suggesting that 
truth does arise as a natural consequence of argument. 
Truth is always, and finally, a function of human judg-
ment, and the humanities are a constant and undeniable 
invitation to make the kinds of judgments which are 
the means of becoming responsible moral agents. 
If this invitation to moral agency is the defining char-
acteristic of the humanities, then, to be sure, the human-
ities are multiform, but literature, art and music have 
a primacy inasmuch as their integrity in this regard is 
not to be long flouted, nor successfully even in the short 
run. There is the painful honesty of the student who 
can talk B-plusish about the sonata form but is honest 
enough to say that he has never heard a symphony which 
appealed to him. Such a student, it seems to me, has 
been better served by music and is a better man than 
the individual who tries to persuade him that he knows 
reasons for saying that he likes symphonies. 
Even if we agreed that our students should pass 
through our talk to an appreciation of the medium, 
one will be moved to suggest that the media themselves 
involve form and the considerable drudgery of acquir-
ing mastery. This is, of course, true. But there is a 
clear difference between mastering a medium so that 
the fact of mastery is no longer exhibited except to the 
ingenuous, and the thetic disciplines in which the for-
mal element is itself the concern. 
In this respect we are, surely, much better situated 
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given the character of contemporary art and music. 
I confess to having· entertained at one time or another 
all of the wrong notions about contemporary literature, 
art and music: they weren't enjoyable, they were pre-
tentious, formless , infantile, boring in their attempt to 
be provocative, and so on. But these "wrong notions" 
were entertained often only because one attempted to 
get a word of clarification from the artist himself. If 
there is a sui generis character to artistic production, 
then it surely denies the significance of even the artist's 
own commentary. 
We have gone through stages when the function of 
art was primarily allegorical or just plain representa-
tive. Contemporary art is, surely, more nearly parabolic 
by nature. Now parables either work or fail; they should 
not require footnotes . If parables work, it is because the 
hearer supplied the elements necessary. Thus one reads 
Found Poem-------~ 
In the first half of the century But 
a Gloucester schooner 
returning from a trading voyage to Virginia 
brought to Cape Ann one John Hews. 
He was a Welshman by birth, 
and in 1702, 
when he was seventeen years old, 
he had been impressed into service 
in a man-of-war. 
He had sailed 
In the expedition against Cadiz 
and had participated 
in the action off Vigo. 
He had been sentenced to deportation 
for a crime 
of which the exact nature 
is not recorded 
and had served his time 
in Virginia. 
He accompanied 
the expeditions against Louisburg 
in 1745 and 1758-
at the age of seventy-three years 
his martial ardor 
was still unquenched. 
He was remembered long after his death 










the literature, views the paintings, listens to the music 
and suffers from no compulsion to chatter brightly 
about what they all mean. Thus, surely, the mode of 
appreciation exactly matches the mode of expression, 
and one is not continually engaged in giving thetic 
transformations either for one's work as produced or 
for another's work as appreciated. 
With Sighs Too Deep for Words 
I have said little explicit about "what is human about 
the humanities." Let me attempt to remedy that omis-
sion on the way to my conclusion. First, and most easily 
stated, what is human about the humanities humanely 
taught is their calling to mind the need of personal 
judgment. Unless one is sufficiently craven to insist on 
providing the criteria for judgment as if all judgments 
were already complete, one gives a student a sense of 
gular thing about him 
pn which grew upon him 
of dying 
a natural death 
and determined 
to starve himself. 
re than a hundred years old 
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u regard it thoughtlessly, 
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so weary. 
CHARLES VANDERSEE 
Found in Charles Boardman Hawes, Gloucester by Land and Sea 
(Boston : Little, Brown and Company. 1923). 
moral agency by inviting him to make the judgments 
which can alone be his. Of course, moral agency of this 
nature can be elicited in any number of fields, including 
science. But in fields other than the humanities so-
called, the problem of information seems continually 
to undercut the justification of the student's deciding. 
In fact, of course, no amount of information ever con-
stitutes a man and expert in moral judgments. But there 
seem to be so many facts which bear upon judgments 
that a student is often misled into thinking that a suffi-
ciency of facts would obviate the need for making a 
judgment. Surely it is immoral to permit such an impres-
sion to rest undisturbed, but it makes the work of the 
teacher - I should prefer to say the so-called teacher -
less strenuous. 
The nature of the humanities is such that one can 
never quite convince himself or his students that infor-
mation about a work or its originator can take the place 
of the work taken in and for itself. Properly conceived, 
of course, our discussion of the work may itself invite 
judgment as a sort of ancillary work. But one might 
suggest that, in the several fields in the humanities, 
teachers are John the Baptist figures - pointing beyond 
themselves. Our pointing may have qualities of elo-
quence and insight, but the pointing makes no claims for 
itself. "Behold ... !" Then is our work a celebration rather 
than an unlovely attempt to overcome the implastic 
nature of the original. 
First, then, the humanities are human in that they are 
an invitation to each man to make the judgments and 
perform the acts which constitute him a free moral 
agent. The second point is that these judgments are 
not simply an exercise in the making of judgments but 
are themselves significantly moral acts. 
It may be difficult for me to get to this second point 
because of the long tradition which wants to suggest 
that aesthetic judgments are in a class apart from moral 
judgments, whereas I assert that all judgments are of a 
piece. Here I am reminded of the King James transla-
tion of Romans 8:26: "Groanings which cannot be ut-
tered." I have taken a long time to suggest that intellec-
tual utterances are often less than revelatory. But what 
about the groans? Surely the same kind of primordial 
energy which leads to creative activity flows in the act 
of appreciation, and anything which brings a man back 
to the springs of being is moral. One might go further 
to suggest that the groans mark the overcoming of alien-
ation. 
This is not to assert that intellectual activity is in it-
self an activity alien to human nature. But there is, as 
Hume suggests, a constant tendency to take the part for 
the whole - as if men were essentially rational, and 
further, the rational, the thetic impulse, has no closure 
generic to itself. As Kierkegaard argued, reason cannot 
find its own limit. That intellectual activity does not 
spin on endlessly by the perpetual impulse which is 
formally possible is a consequence of the fact that man, 
the animal (the embodied, if you prefer), simply tires, 
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says "I am satisfied," or for reasons simply impossible 
to explicate regards the matter as closed. 
One acknowledges that "premature closure" is some-
times a consequence of sloth or even anti-intellectualism, 
but it is not the case that every assertion of the limits 
of reason constitutes anti-intellectualism. As in such a 
philosopher as David Hume, this is rather a claim to a 
fuller comprehension of human nature. And it is this 
generic comprehension of human nature which the hu-
manities serve, as opposed to the distortions actual and 
possible within the thetic. Without making a category 
mistake, one can assert that the appreciation of a work of 
art is itself a significant moral achievement. It leads to 
a confrontation with the deep springs of human exis-
tence while frustrating adequate linguistic expression. 
In short, to realize the human in the humanities is 
From the Chapel 
itself a moral achievement. This seems to be justifiable 
if only for that man seeks his proper nature as his proper 
end. I rarely congratulate my dog for his caninity, but 
I am often moved by the spectacle of a humane act on 
the part of man. To know what is human is, in fact, a 
high moral achievement. And the teaching of the hu-
manities are less successfully deformed than other areas 
which conduct us to the spectacle of our nature; they 
are most likely to induce a sense of what is human, a 
feeling for freedom, a demand for dignity. 
It was not a Greek but a Hebrew, with all of the genius 
of an antimetaphysician, who could write: 
Lord, make me to know my end, 
And the measure of my days, what it is. 
Such a couplet might become the motto for the hu-
manities become humane. 
A Word for Theology 
By STEPHEN C. ROSE 
Lecturer, Associ11ted Co/leges of the Midwest 
Urben Studies Progrem 
Chicego, Illinois 
In the last decade some of us were faced with so many 
"new" theologies that one is loath to add to their number 
in this new decade. We likely need a moratorium on 
"new" theologies until sufficient experience accumulates 
to justify the formulation of any of them in systematic 
terms. Meanwhile, in the present mix of proposals and 
counter-proposals, I believe that the word liberation 
best expresses a dimension of the Gospel which is being 
made manifest again in our time. 
Liberation rather than hope or the secular city or the 
death of God seems the more productive term at pres-
ent. Liberation can be related specifically to the politi-
cal dimension of life , since it has application to the 
colonial situation here and abroad from which more and 
more men seek liberation. 
Liberation (tiber) recalls the freedom which the late 
Karl Barth suggested should be the primary concern of 
American theology in the days ahead. Liberation is an 
evocative term in relation to the person, for it applies 
to the individual pilgrimage as much as it does the 
universal political struggle. It offers a standard for 
evaluating secular theology, a context in which some 
death of God thought is relevant, and a dimension which 
is implied but not sufficiently explicit in the theology 
of hope. 
Liberation is a process and, like the Gospel, assumes a 
condition of bondage from which one needs and seeks 
release. It is possible to speak meaningfully of stages of 
liberation, both in terms of external political history 
and internal experience. Liberation can also be seen as 
a state and as a consummation. 
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Liberation is happily a term which has been so iden-
tified with Third World movements that its use in a 
Christian context helps avoid the implications (inher-
ent in some secular theology) that theology is address-
ing problems primarily from the vantage point of the 
affluent white West. 
Liberation is the term which has increasingly become 
the focus of world conversation. It is a term which gath-
ers up the meanings in the efforts to move away from 
the welfare and warfare states toward a world commun-
ity without colonies and colonialists. Often liberation 
is treated in a context which makes it possible to see 
parallels with authentic Biblical thought. We ought to 
be able to bring to the worldwide concern with libera-
tion the insight and catalytic relevance of the Gospel. 
Not long ago some churchmen were discussing and 
attempting renewal, predicating their analysis of society 
and the Christian mission on the optimism of Pope John 
and on the glorious innocence of the civil rights move-
ment which appeared to redress injustices by moral 
exertion. Today that analysis is strained to the breaking 
point, if not shattered. 
At least two things happened. First, we have come to 
greater recognition of our bondage, not merely our con-
siderable bondage to personal hang-ups, but also our 
political and sociological bondc:.ge. The latter bondage 
emerges quite clearly in a colonial analogy in which 
white Americans are (willing or not) beneficiaries of a 
complex system of cultural, technological, and economic 
domination of others. Secondly, having lost our earlier 
The Cresset 
bearings, we possess no more than temporary certainty 
about the way ahead. 
Today there is more than a suspicion that a time of 
reflection and re-education must precede a struggle for 
liberation. I believe that the move from renewal to lib-
eration, from the imagery of smooth institutional change 
in a progressive direction to the more Biblical imagery 
of profound and sweeping change in all of life has taken 
place among many. We can speak of renewal today only 
in terms of liberation. 
What would be some of the elements that might con-
tribute to a theology of liberation? 
First, our dilemma points in the direction of conceiv-
ing a new man. It is hardly necessary to document the 
manner in which thought moved during the past dec-
ade from the consideration of external to internal real-
ity, from notions of political and social adjustment to 
perceptions of deep sea changes possibly taking place 
within man himself. What is happening has yet to be 
described convincingly, and I would hope that the 
primary intellectual task in the near future will be to 
describe what is actually taking place within us and 
around us. Apparently the analyses with which men 
-:!ntered this century are no longer adequate and as yet 
we have only fragments toward a new synthesis. At 
least two suggestions, however, point to the direction in 
which the quest for the new man is going. Both come 
from psychoanalysts who have moved beyond the class-
bound, individualist orthodoxies of classical therapies. 
R. D. Laing's book, The Politics of Experience, strikes 
me as a novel, if often obscure, beginning effort to probe 
the alienation of the white European and North Ameri-
can. Says Laing: 
We in Europe and North America are the colonists. and in order to 
sustain our amazing images of ourselves as God 's gift to the vast 
majority of the starving human species, we have to interiorize our 
violence upon ourselves and our children and to employ the rhetoric 
of morality to describe this process. 
In order to rationalize our industrial-military complex, we have to 
destroy our capacity to see clearly any more what is in front of, and 
to imagine what is beyond, our noses . Long before a thermonuclear 
war can come about. we have to lay waste our own sanity. We begin 
with the children. It is imperative to catch them in time ... Children 
are not yet fools , but we shall turn them into imbeciles like our-
selves, with high IQ's if possible. 
From the moment of birth, when the Stone Age baby confronts the 
twentieth-century mother, the baby is subjected to these forces of 
violence, called love, as its mother and father, and their parents 
and their parents before them , have been. These forces are mainly 
concerned with destroying most of its potentialities, and on the 
whole this enterprise is successful. By the time the new human-
being is fifteen or so. we are left with a being like ourselves, a half-
crazed creature more or less adjusted to a mad world. This is nor-
mality in our present age. 
Laing's book is an intentionally inconclusive explora-
tion of contemporary alienation, and I have quoted 
from it to suggest a trenchant critique of alienation 
which may be underway. Within discipline after discip-
line attention is being given to the question of man him-
self. But at the same time there is a move away from 
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simple individualism to a deeper and moral questioning 
of the very basis of normality as the world presently 
defines it. There is in essence deeply rooted doubt be-
ing cast on the entire human enterprise as it is presently 
undertaken, and there is a quest for the fundamental 
unity of man and men that has been eroded by modern 
civilization and its attending horrors. 
Laing does not suggest the possibility that contempor-
ary alienation might lead to any historical upheavals 
that may be needed to deflect the onward rush of a de-
mented normality. The latter concern is taken up by the 
American analyst, Robert Jay Lifton. In his study of 
the effects on the survivors of the nuclear blasting of 
Hiroshima and in his study of the cultural revolution 
in China, Lifton developed the notion that man breaks 
in an important way with the immediate past when that 
past seems to promise no prospect of immortality. That 
is to say, basic psychological changes occur when indi-
vidual lives are wrenched from the continuities of the 
past and when the future is even more unlikely to give 
mortal lives at least an historical immortality. I wish 
at this point only to introduce Lifton's conception of an 
actual new man emerging from the alienation of some 
modern young persons in particular. He refers to this 
new man as "protean man." 
His psychological style . ... is one of interminable exploration and 
flux, his self-process characterized by readily easy shifts in belief and 
identification. He can readily embrace a set of convictions or respond 
to various kinds of symbols and images; his difficulty is maintaining 
inner connection with these for more than a brief experimental 
interlude. 
This new man, says Lifton, has a prevailing tone of 
mockery. This mockery may in fact be a specific rejec-
tion of moral earnestness and rectitude. It may also be a 
means for giving voice to the weakening of "fit" between 
the inner and the outer world which is a characteristic 
of some of the young in our time. "It is his way," sug-
gests Lifton, "of confronting death." 
Lifton goes on to say: "The protean style results from 
the radical breakdown in man's more structured rela-
tionships to traditional symbols. It is also influenced 
by the world-wide revolution in mass communications 
which tends to flood the individual psyche with endless-
ly variable images in every sphere of life." 
A Recovery of""Fit" 
One implication of Lifton's analysis is that the pres-
ent movement of history, especially as it is affected by 
technology, itself is aiding the process of thrusting men 
into totally new relationships with what he has hitherto 
conceived as reality. What may be happening and where 
it is all going is, of course, difficult to say. But as time 
goes on we may find ourselves developing almost 
instinctively the consciousness that is needed for survival 
in the coming world. Essentially Laing and Lifton are 
dealing with the issue of survival through fundamental 
change. For Laing what we call mental illness should be 
revered as a trip back to the roots of alienation; for 
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Lifton survival is intrinsically related to one's sense of 
immortality. 
I focus on these men for two reasons. First, they re-
mind us that any lively form of liberation will involve a 
recovery of "fit" between internal and external exper-
ience. Psychology and history are separate departments 
in universities, but the realities with which they deal 
are inseparable in life. Secondly, they imply that the 
process of alienation from present history is natural, 
necessary, and a prerequisite to spiritual or vocational 
awakening. Liberation is thus related to the variety of 
terms and symbols we call death and resurrection. 
The focus on liberation in theology is also helpful, for 
it connects with the actual process of liberation taking 
place at the edges of some of our churches. This process 
involves the organization of seminary students, the 
spontaneous development of lay and ministerial groups, 
the formation of various caucuses to deal with demon-
inational waywardness, as well as groups for the culti-
vation of spiritual life. There is also lively growth in 
Black theology, communal modes of ministry, and the 
dismantling of some bureaucracies. And where iradi-
tional denominational incomes are lacking, commun-
ities are forming to support their own ministries. 
The principal characteristic of liberation within the 
church is the correspondence some people are discover-
ing between the actual Gospel and the present truth. 
Part of that truth is the need to confront a world in love 
with death - if the actions of the most powerfully sup-
Political Affairs 
ported men and institutions are indications of what is 
loved among us. 
The theological exploration of the Gospel under the 
aspect of liberation sees reality not as a coherent and 
concluded environment but as a semi-chaos where death 
and life are in conflict. It moves believing men to be-
come a liberated church in the conflict, taking symbolic 
and concrete actions. The Gospel under the aspect of 
liberation does not lead to an acceptance of the world 
as it is because the lease-holders of the present world 
need an evangelical new life offered them as much as 
the powerless need to organize themselves to try to 
bring the powers into equity. Whatever social goals the 
liberated church has, however, need to be defined 
principally by those whose oppression is primarily ob-
jective rather than subjective. 
The liberated church takes from its more religiously 
conservative brothers the emphasis on conversion, but 
a conversion not to nostalgia or the status quo but to 
the agitating and healing stance of Jesus . From 
its religiously liberal brothers, it takes seriously the 
judgment that anyone who claims to have a corner on 
the truth is engaging in obfuscation, and that includes 
the liberated church. 
Surely liberation carries more possibility for theology 
than the secular city, the death of God (minus resur-
rection), and notions of hope which have scant basis in 
fact. Like all words it is corruptible, but it has more 
flesh on it than most words do today. 
A Case of Malapportionment 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------By ALBERT R.TROST 
Seven years ago the United States Supreme Court 
ordered the principles of equality and majority rule to 
be applied to the U.S. House of Representatives by ap-
plying the one-man, one-vote doctrine to the drawing of 
congressional district lines. However, unequal repre-
sentation was not then (nor is it now) the result primar-
ily of malapportioned districts. In the United States 
Congress, equality and majority rule are seriously frus-
trated by the internal organization of the Congress it-
self. I refer particularly to the seniority rule as it is 
applied to committee assignments and the hierarchy 
within the standing committees. 
Seniority in both the Senate and the House is deter-
mined primarily on the basis of uninterrupted service 
in the respective chamber. When there is a tie in length 
of service, factors such as previous public office may be 
used to establish the seniority rank. Seniority is the 
only consideration in determining the hierarchy with 
the standing committees of the House and Senate. The 
member of the majority party with the greatest tenure 
18 
on the committee is entitled to be chairman, and the 
minority party member with the greatest tenure is the 
ranking minority member . The chairmanship of sub-
committees is also determined by seniority. Although 
initial assignments to standing committees cannot be 
based on seniority, seniority is an important consider-
ation when a man moves from one committee to another, 
usually to a position of more influence and prestige. 
It is fairly common knowledge that the seniority 
system works to the advancement of senators and repre-
sentatives from one-party states or districts. This means 
that the one-party Democratic South is favored, as 
are one-party Democratic districts in large cities. For 
the Republicans, a rural or suburban seat in the Middle 
West is very secure. In the House of Representatives, 
where it is possible for the urban and suburban congress-
man to achieve greater seniority, chairmen and minor-
ity ranking members tend to be only slightly more con-
servative than the average representative. 
In the Senate, the seniority system has a stronger 
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effect in placing more conservative senators in posi-
tions of influence in the committees. However, since 
certain regions are definitely over-represented among 
senior members of the standing committees, there is 
no guarantee that they will represent the policy posi-
tions of their more junior colleagues. Of the seventeen 
standing committees of the Senate, slightly over half 
(9) have chairmen from the South. Of the twenty-one 
committees in the House, slightly less than half (9) 
have chairmen from the South. 
To put the effects of the seniority system into sharper 
focus, it is useful to examine a situation that occurs in 
the present Congress. Louisiana has about 3,500,000 
people, about 1.7% of the total population of the United 
States. This population entitles Louisiana to eight of 
the 435 members of the House, or about 1.8% of the to-
tal, which, divided into eight equal districts, is a fair 
representation. It is equal representation - until one 
considers where seniority has placed Louisiana's eight 
congressmen and two senators in the committee system. 
The two senators, Allen J. Ellender and Russell B. 
Long, have served a total of fifty-five years between 
them. This long tenure in the Senate has entitled them 
to chairmanships. Ellender heads the Appropriations 
Committee and Long heads the Finance Committee. No 
spending measure or taxing bill can get through the 
Senate unless it passes through a committee chaired by 
a senator from Louisiana. Senator Ellender supports 
the "Conservative Coalition" 73% of the time and Long 
supports the conservative position 60% of the time. (I 
cite these "Conservative Coalition" Support Scores as 
reported in the Congressional Quarterly for the 91st 
Congress.) This support for the conservative position 
is more than double that of the average Democratic 
senator. 
The Mass Media 
One of the eight congressmen, Representative F. 
Edward Hebert, is chairman of the Armed Services Com-
mittee. Another, Representative Otto E. Passman, 
sixth-ranking democratic member of the powerful 
House Appropriations Committee, is chairman of the 
Foreign Operations Subcommittee, through which 
foreign aid bills must pass. A third, Representative 
John Rarick, is a subcommittee chairman of the Agri-
culture Committee, even though he was stripped of 
two years of seniority in 1969 for support of George 
Wallace for President in 1968. A fourth, Representa-
tive Hale Boggs, rose to second-ranking majority mem-
ber of the powerful Ways and Means Committee before 
resigning this year to be Majority Leader of the House 
of Representatives, a position not dependent on sen-
iority. 
A fifth, Representative Speedy 0. Long, is also a 
member of the Armed Services Committee and chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Military Construction. 
Of the remaining three congressmen, two have assign-
ments to influential committees, Ways and Means and 
Judiciary, but do not have the seniority required for 
formal positions of leadership. Only the most junior 
member of Louisiana's delegation, Representative 
Patrick T. Caffery in his second term, draws a mundane 
assignment on the Public Works Committee. These 
rewards have come as the result of an average tenure 
for the eight men of six consecutive terms. 
It has not been the purpose of this discussion to docu-
ment a plot by a group of people in Louisiana to take 
over the United States Congress. Seniority and the com-
mittee system are no more amenable to the maneuver-
ing of a conspiracy than they are to the power of the 
voter armed with equal representation and majority 
rule. 
Notes on the New Nostalgia 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------By RICHARD LEE 
The gentle zephyrs of nostalgia now blowing through 
the mass media don't carry me back far enough . 
Certainly the present nostalgia is understandable. 
It is a natural reaction to the "now" and "young" and 
"revolutionary" and "futuristic" strummings and 
thumpings in the media of a few years ago, none of 
which could go on exponentially. It doubtless has a 
desirably cooling and consoling effect on the psyches 
which the media massage. 
At the moment the most we seem able to turn back is 
thirty or forty years. Nostalgia, of course, sticks close to 
living memory - especially when it so thickly coats 
products to be sold. At least nobody yet longs publicly 
for the Golden Age of Greece, or for the flowering of 
the Middle Ages, much less the American Revolution 
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nearing its bicentenary. 
Rather, the nostalgic themes in the mass media are 
now taken mostly from the Americana of the 40's, 30's, 
and 20's. Good rock music, like jazz before it, goes off 
into purist cultivation for a discriminating few. The 
swing sounds and simple love lyrics or just plain non-
sense lyrics gradually return. Country music is renas-
cent, too, and old time religion revives among the top 
ten tunes and the Jesus freaks. (As a Christian, it always 
puzzles me that a spooky Jesus is always near the center 
of the nostalgia of the world; would some kind pagan 
tell me why?) 
The advertisements of some corporations mute their 
emphasis on the new and experimental and remind us 
how old and reliable they are in sepia tones and type 
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with elaborate serifs inside curly borders. Movies re-
cover luxury, sentimentality, and romance. Hair and 
its imitations depart for wherever Aquarians go after 
death, and Broadway puts the buck and wing back on 
taps. Over-sized soup cans are no longer Pop art but 
huge TV commercial stages for Busby Berkeley ex-
travaganzas with waxy showgirls in star-spangled hot 
pants. Buick commercials show the 1940 model driving 
up to the 1971 model. 
The midnight movies bring back Nelson Eddy and 
Jeanette MacDonald musicals. Fashion magazines fea-
ture the "new look" of the 30's with midiskirts and 
cloche hats. Illustrators return to Rockwellian rural 
scenes. Radio stations rebroadcast old "Shadow" shows 
when evil was all in the heart of man. TV talk shows are 
depoliticized and reminisce with silent picture stars. 
And on and on, backward. 
So far the 50's are understandably untouched, but it 
could be the logical end of it all. Save your Pat Boone 
45's, pegged pants, crew cut wax, and chartreuse Ford 
Crestliners. (For that matter, save your 60's stuff, too, 
for what will need to be one of the oddest waves of nos-
talgia sometime in the early 80's.) 
For some the present nostalgia is as campy as the 60's 
nostalgia for W. C. Fields, Bogart, Dracula, Batman, 
buckskins, beards, boots, and barefeet. Some of the pre-
sent nostalgia is cousin to all the garden nostalgia of 
the hippies and Consciousness III's. For some it is a 
sweetened touch of death and some very sodden Welt-
schmerz. For some it is a little escape to forget where we 
really are in time and evil. For some it is just another 
job, the lucrative business of exploiting sentimentality. 
For some it is hope, a recovery of archetypes, and a 
searching for roots in the past. 
Nostalgia, of course, is a highly selective return to 
the past - the memory blindered by nostalgia sees only 
a part of it. Such a past, like Roquefort, has improved 
with age because much of it has decayed. I have just 
come away from some of the new nostalgia, a transi-
tionally rocked up but still recognizable recording of 
"One Meat Ball." An older man with me remarked 
about the pleasant memories of a happier past that the 
song stirred in him! A student, yet in her teens, re-
minded him that the origin of the song was real hunger 
in the great Depression. I suppose if you are a student 
and have had that Depression thrown up to you often 
enough as one greater than your own depressions, you 
do some serious study of it. 
I work on the edges of a university, and it's my good 
luck to look over the shoulders of scholars whose voca-
tion it is to "think backward," to penetrate our past as 
wholly, honestly, and as imaginatively as they can. I 
note the best of them have the gift to imagine that 
which is familiar to us as it must have seemed to men 
when it was new. And sometimes there follows from this 
painstaking study a "revival" of interest in this or that 
historical figure (often admittedly at the centenaries of 
his birth or death). Or a "nco-orthodoxy" of this or that 
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body of thought springs up. Here the past is probed 
and consulted in order to face the future afresh. Not so, 
I think, with nostalgia. 
At least it appears to me that nostalgia often sharpens 
the personal experience of historical change which it 
hopes to soften. At its deepest levels, beyond faddish-
ness, nostalgia may paradoxically intensify historical 
change itself. The nostalgia which underlies much zeal 
for progress has been noted often enough. The wildest 
utopias, upon examination, look suspiciously like the 
womb, and even modest reform proposals these days 
sound like longings for the good old days when only 
God could end the world. What is less widely noted is 
that those who turn to nostalgia to ward off the tumult 
of the present can also end up intensifying the change 
they deplore. Most efforts to "rescue the past" concrete-
ly would now require changes so vast the mind boggles 
to think of them. A fuller view of history than nostalgia 
allows reminds us that restorations are also revolutions. 
A Remedial Whimsy 
The present nostalgia in the mass media, like any 
other mood the media capture and exploit, will pass, 
hastened away by the very media which will overexpose 
it and the mediators themselves who will become bored 
with it. Which brings me to the reason why I mused 
earlier than the present nostalgia doesn't take me back 
far enough. 
David Riesman pointed up the formative influences 
of the mass media on the increasing numbers of "other-
directed" men in American society nearly twenty years 
ago. McLuhan, Lifton, Ellul and others since have done 
no better than embroider his point that the media have 
largely unreflected and undeflected influences toward 
the massing of popular consciousness. To be perfectly 
whimsical, my idea of a full, cleansing gale of nostalgia 
would therefore be one which took us back to a time 
when none of us were massaged, heated or cooled, by 
the vast network of media at all. 
It would be terrifying at first. We should need to 
talk to one another and touch as neighbors. We should 
need to develop our personal and regional and ethnic 
talents for entertaining and instructing one another. 
We might even go outdoors and discover what remains 
of nature to befriend it. We might read (migosh!) books 
we really care about. We should have to support and 
respect and encourage our own theatres, singers, ar-
tists, musicians, poets, and story-tellers. We should 
have to think and act and feel again and not merely 
passively pick up signals. We should need to teach our 
children how to nurture and husband the world rather 
than to buy and consume it so plasticly. We should need 
to teach ourselves once again our own unmediated re-
sponses to life. 
This may be no more desirable than our present pass. 
But to each his own nostalgia. Even if it is for me to-
ward a world I never knew. 
The Cresset 
Books of the Month 
BUDDHISM IN TRANSITION. By Donald 
K. Swearer. Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1970 . $2.65 . 
Much ink has been spilt in recent years in 
discussing the question of the relationship of 
religion and culture. Quite obviously, religion 
exists within and as a part of culture, but in 
some measure it also lives in tension with 
culture. With its normative symbols, religion 
takes a critical stance over against the cul-
ture in which it lives ; yet, at the same time 
changes within the culture force religion it-
self to change or to become irrelevant and 
insignificant. This is the issue that is explored 
in Buddhism in Transition. 
The process of cultural and religious change 
is one with which we in the West are inti-
mately acquainted. Western culture and , with 
it, western consciousness has undergone a 
process of radical reshaping in the past sever-
al centuries. This change continues at an ever-
accelerating pace. Western man finds it in-
creasing difficult to hold onto his former view 
of this world as one which is ruled , both in 
nature and history, by a supreme and benevo-
lent God. 
The collapse of this religious world view 
and the difficulty of finding a satisfactory 
substitute continues to occupy the attention 
of scholars in a wide variety of disciplines . 
They chronicle in great detail the process of 
this shift in consciousness. They invent power-
ful ways of describing the condition of the 
modern man who feels himself caught in these 
rushing waves of change. They talk of "the 
contemporary crisis in religious conscious-
ness;" they talk of a protean life-style, one 
marked by a series of fundamental shifts in 
loyalty and commitment; they talk of the "sec-
ular spirit," of the loss of transcendence and 
the new search for transcendence. 
Western Christian theologians have taken 
up the challenge with great gusto and are 
pouring out a steady stream of books and ar-
ticles which attempt a restatement and rein-
terpretation of the Christian faith. Some of 
these statements seem very tenuously related 
to the classical formulations of the faith , and 
thus only serve to illustrate further how deep-
ly we are convinced that cultural change re-
quires religious adaptation if our religious 
commitment is to have fundamental signifi-
cance for our life in this new age. 
This process of cui tural and religious 
change is now a world-wide phenomenon, 
pressing itself upon people in every region 
where science and technology have come to 
offer their most ambiguous blessings. Not 
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The Future of Buddhism 
only does the development of technology im-
ply a radical change in the everyday patterns 
of practical living, but it forces new ways of 
experiencing and new ways of formulating 
our understanding of the world, the nature of 
man, and the meaning of human existence. 
These pressures of modernity have, in re-
cent decades , made themselves keenly felt in 
the Theravada Buddhist countries of South-
east Asia. What will be the role of Buddhism 
in the process of change in these countries? 
It is to this question that Donald Swearer 
addresses himself in Buddhism in Transition. 
The author, a professor of religion at Swarth-
more College, brings his considerable know-
ledge of Buddhism and his recent experience 
of a year of study and travel in these Buddhist 
countries to a thoughtful consideration of 
the future of Buddhism. He draws some rather 
positive conclusions. He believes that Bud-
dhism will play a strong and creative role in 
this changing culture, and, what is more, he 
is convinced that Buddhism will play a sig-
nificant role also in shaping "the coming 
world civilization(s)." (p. 16.) 
One with at least a minimal understanding 
of the fundamentals of Buddhist thought 
might initially register a slight surprise at 
Swearer's conclusions. How can Buddhism, a 
religion which western scholars have for so 
long regarded as a "life and world-denying" 
approach to life, possibly become actively 
and positively involved in the processes of 
improving man's earthly and temporal situa-
tion? Is not Buddhism an advocate of "de-
tachment" from the world? Does not Budd-
hism find i~ material earthly enjoyment the 
greatest of temptations, the greatest enemy of 
true human fulfillment? Do not the lures of 
the good life invite men to craving (tanha) , 
that desperate clinging to impermanence as 
though by our clinging we could make it 
permanent and as though it would in the end 
satisfy man's deepest longings? 
Is it not the higher wisdom to remain aloof 
from the struggle for material and sensory 
satisfactions in the knowledge that the world 
is ultimately incapable of undergoing signifi-
cant improvement? Does not the present effort 
to enhance the physical conditions of life only 
add to man's delusions and prevent him from 
realizing that suffering and unsatisfactoriness 
(dukkha) are the abiding and all-pervading 
characteristics of this world? Does not the 
lure of the "good life" only militate against 
the salvation of men and lead them to even 
deeper frustrations and unfulfilledness , not 
to speak of lower and less fortunate rebirths? 
Does not the very existence of Buddhist mon-
astic communities in these countries hold up 
the ideal of withdrawal from worldly concerns 
and ambitions? How can such a religion be 
expected to participate in a creative and po~i­
tive way in the present reshaping of culture? 
As author Donald Swearer shows us so very 
well , Buddhism has not been unambiguously 
negative in its view of ordinary earthly exist-
ence. It has been critical of man's "natural" 
way of living in this world and has shown him 
the Path to transcend this state, but it is 
hardly accurate to describe the Buddhist way 
as a "life and world-denying" approach to 
life. 
Nirvana and Nationalism 
It should be remembered that from the very 
beginning of Buddhism there was consider-
able emphasis upon teaching the Path to the 
laity, not so that they would leave the life of 
the householder and withdraw to the forest , 
but to enable them to cultivate those virtues 
and that wisdom which would enable them to 
progress toward the goal of perfection and, 
thus , a serene and happy life, in some sense, 
being "in the world but not of the world." 
Laymen were taught to honor and serve par-
ents, elders and rulers, to love their children 
and neighbors, and to cultivate the well-
being of the entire community of man. 
As Swearer points out, Buddhist involve-
ment in the world is well illustrated by the 
example of the great Indian Buddhist king. 
Asoka (3rd c. B.C.). The Buddha's teaching 
about compassion for all beings led Asoka to 
cease his warring ways and to dedicate his 
rule to the establishment of hospitals and 
other centers of mercy for both men and ani-
mals. Buddhist social concern during the reign 
of Asoka is extended still further in later 
legends; he is seen as a kind of sacred king, 
the universal ruler ( cakkravattin ). the one 
"who governs through his personal merit for 
the well-being and security of the individual 
and society." (p. 37) He is the one who must 
order the society according to eternal truth 
(dharma), so that people may have the neces-
sary conditions in which to pursue the spirit-
ual and moral ideals of the Buddhist Path . 
To that end the king has a most intimate 
connection with the order of monks (sangha) . 
He is charged with their support and their 
safety, and they, in turn, bless and sanction 
his kingship. It is this kind of social and 
political model which became and remained 
a part of Theravada Buddhism's outlook as 
it expanded to Ceylon and then into South-
east Asia. Thus, the model for "this-worldly" 
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involvement in Buddhism is an old and hon-
ored one and has lived side by side with those 
other Buddhist ideals of detachment and the 
pursuit of an other-worldly Nirvana. 
From recent history, Swearer calls our 
attention to the feeling which is strong in 
Southeast Asian countries, that Buddhism 
and nationhood are intimately related. He 
discusses at some length the case of U Nu, 
former prime minister of Burma. "U Nu con-
ceived of Buddhism as providing the basic 
answer to Burma's many post-independence 
problems." (p. 41) He espoused a kind of 
Buddhist socialism and felt that Buddhism 
would be able to help the people to over-
come their self-acquisitive nature in the in-
terest of the welfare of all. While some have 
seen U Nu as an opportunist in this respect , 
Swearer is convincing in presenting him as 
one who was both devout and creative in re-
lating the Buddhist tradition to modernity. 
In a similar vein , Swearer presents the 
cases of the great Sinhalese champion of in-
dependence for Ceylon, S.W.R.D. Bandar-
anaike, and that of Prince Norodom Sihanouk 
in Cambodia, each of whom worked and 
dreamed for the future of his country in the 
interest of independent nationhood and in the 
interest of the strengthening of Buddhism . 
The role of Vietnamese monks in the demise 
of the Diem regime serves as still another 
example of Buddhism's part in the shaping of 
Southeast Asia's future . 
Particularly interesting for giving the read-
er a feel for the role of Buddhists in Thailand 
is the author's chapter, "Two Portraits of 
Thai Buddhism." Swearer discusses two 
monks, Phra Maha Sila and Buddhadasa 
Bhikkhu. In the former portrait we begin to 
get a glimpse of the relation of the order of 
monks to social development. Phra Maha 
Sila is a monk and an educator. Many of the 
monks who work with him are involved in 
such things as counseling agencies , commun-
ity centers, hospitals, schools, free hotels , 
charity employment agencies and agricultural 
uplift programs. 
Buddhadasa, on the other hand , illustrates 
Buddhism's attempt to reinterpret its own 
tradition in the light of the contemporary 
situation. He emphasizes that the Buddhist 
pursuit of redemption does not demand a 
literal withdrawal from worldly involvements . 
He defines redemption (presumably Nirvana) 
in strongly "this-worldly" terms as the move-
ment "from one mode of existence and rebirth 
into a new one, release from suffering and sin 
and the experience of a new freedom and 
peace . ... " (p. 108) Samsara becomes, for 
Buddhadasa, a pointing toward a new state, 
one in which man is "freed from preoccupa-
tion with the self." (p. 109) He is, in Swearer's 
terms, a "demythologizer" and a brilliant 
interpreter, who has also taken some import-
ant first steps in an attempt to begin a con-
structive dialogue with Christianity. 
In all of this , Swearer is not interested in 
watching Buddhism simply capitulate to the 
tide of change. He continues to s.earch for 
signs that, while participating in change and 
undergoing change itself, Buddhism must 
maintain that "creative tension" with culture 
which is the true and necessary role of any 
religion. 
Can Buddhism make any difference in the 
West? Can it contribute anything at all to 
Christian ways of thinking? Swearer intro-
duces the reader to a number of western 
thinkers who answer those questions in the 
affirmative. Roman Catholics, Thomas Mer-
ton and Dom Aelard Graham , and free lance 
author, Alan Watts , are among those who be-
lieve Buddhism can significantly enrich our 
lives in the West. The growing interest of 
college students in America may be another 
indication that the western mind can find 
meaning in Buddhist thought and practice. 
Perhaps it is too early to know whether this 
youthful exploration of Buddhism will be 
more than ephemeral, but there can be no 
doubt that, in a great many instances , it is a 
genuine quest for meaning. 
With this relatively brief volume, Donald 
Swearer has performed a real service, es-
pecially for the non-specialist reader. South-
east Asia has been on our minds for a long 
time and it promises to remain in the spotlight 
for some time to come. Buddhism in Transi-
tion can be a significant help in understanding. 
EDGAR P. SENNE 
Claiming the Media for the Fulfillment of Man 
TELEVISION - RADIO - FILM FOR 
CHURCHMEN. Volume II in the Series : 
Communication for Churchmen. Edited by 
B. F. Jackson, Jr. Nashville: Abingdon Press , 
c. 1969. $6 .50 . 
This is volume two in the series Communi-
cation for Churchmen, edited by B. F. Jack-
son, Jr., whose regular job calls for a pretty 
big letterhead : Executive Director of Com-
munication Processes and Learning Resour-
ces, Division of the Local Church, United 
Methodist Board of Education. The series 
has the admirable aim of giving Christians 
"a better understanding of communication 
and learning so that these processes may be 
employed to greater advantage in the work of 
the church ." The first volume, Communica-
tion - Learning for Churchmen (reviewed 
in this journal , February , 1970). discussed 
basic elements of communication and learn-
ing theory; the present volume gets down to 
specific application. 
Peter A. H. Meggs, Director of Communi-
cations for the Anglican Church in Canada, 
contributes the essay on "Television and the 
Church"; Everett C. Parker, Director of Com-
munication for the United Church of Christ, 
does the same for radio; and John M. Culkin, 
S. J., Director of the Center for Communica-
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tions , Fordham University , writes on film . 
Meggs and Parker both take a strongly in-
stitutional approach to their subjects, pre-
ferring to discuss the corporate and institu-
tional aspects of churchly relations with radio 
and television - reflecting, no doubt, their 
occupational concerns. Meggs begins by re-
producing a stinging bit of criticism from a 
columist in the Toronto Star Weekly Maga-
zine: 
Aside from these [devotions at sign-on 
and televised services) there is nothing. 
Organized religion has left us to get our 
notions of moral anguish from news-
casts, our best understanding of courage 
from Czech citizens and the mothers of 
black school children in New Orleans, 
our best examples of passionate selfless-
ness from the secretaries-general of the 
U.N., our clearest images of grace in pain 
from the widows of assassins' victims and 
our ideas of ethical vigor from Dr. Spock. 
As for The Word itself . . . . well , here is 
Billy Graham, with $1,000 ,000 to spend 
.. . . ( 13) 
If Meggs intended this as an intimation of his 
agenda, as I think he has , then he has left us 
comfortless; the problem remains to plague 
communicating churchmen. To be sure, 
Meggs wants to do more than merely defend 
the work of his own denomination in Canada. 
He is willing to ask whether a Billy Graham 
rally is "a valid expression of the gospel on 
television," and he wants to ask : " Is theology 
(a word about God) present in a secular news-
cast, a documentary, or a situation comedy?" 
With commendable honesty , he admits his 
bias: "denominational broadcasting is as 
wasteful and self-defeating as denomination-
alism itself in our time." But, taking Simon 
Phipps (of Coventry fame) as his theological 
mentor, Meggs can do little more than to poke 
(deserved) fun at churchly attempts to take 
God into his own world , and to advocate pro-
grams which point to a God already present 
in the world , busily "making all things new." 
There is a rather competent - and re-
freshingly non-McLuhanesque - survey of 
the nature of television as a medium and as a 
social force. So, breathes there a c~urchman­
communicator with soul so print-oriented 
that he digs not the videot-box, let him Meggs 
it up a bit here. 
After a rather thorough and illuminating 
survey of the good and bad things churches 
have done on TV (in the course of which sur-
vey he admits that he is not ready to join 
those who would banish telecasts of the 
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church's liturgy). Meggs proposes "New In-
volvement with Television" - principally 
church-sponsored evaluation of existing pro-
gramming and litigation over license renewal 
applications from flagrant violators of the 
public interest (a Ia the UCC vs. WLBT in 
1964). Such involvement of Christians in 
media criticism is justified by the following : 
If God cannot be contained in the church 
building box, he can no more be con-
fined to what we have been content to 
call religious programming. He is the 
God of all creation, including secular 
television programming. (79) 
To be sure! But still undone is the task of 
showing what tqat might mean, of showing 
how God "Gods-it" over secular programs, of 
suggesting what in the world God may be up 
to on Mannix or Star Trek or "with God all 
Missions are Possible." Until Meggs. or some-
one else, can show what God is in fact doing 
in the media, perorations like this one are 
less than helpful: 
God really was standing waist-deep in 
the mass media after all. summoning us 
to full participation with him in claiming 
the media for the fulfillment of man. 
(p. 92) 
Everett C . Parker does us the service of 
showing that radio , far from being moribund, 
has become a whole new kind of communica-
tions force. People listen to radio differently 
than they did prior to the advent of television ; 
radio's role is new, its audience is young and 
on-the-move, and it has a flexibility and "pre-
sence" that TV simply cannot match. The 
churchman's role here is to "aid and abet," by 
helping to focus concern on the ethical/ social 
issues of our time (also and especially those 
posed by the broadcast industry itself) . And 
the goal is to help " the public reassert its 
authority over broadcasting so as to protect 
the freedom of speech of the citizen and his 
right of access to the broadcast media." (p. 
150) Parker is himself a veteran of such ac-
tion. and his insider's report on the UCC/ 
WLBT affair is one of the more interesting 
portions of the book. 
In his survey of developments in religious 
radio programming. Parker curiously has 
little to say about The Lutheran Hour - in 
spite of that program's status as one of the 
earliest and best examples of the use of radio 
for Christian proclamation. But one such com-
ment is a real prize, for it points to the virtue 
of the Hour that was, while implying the 
crisis of the Hour that now is: 
The origins of The Lutheran Hour, for 
example, can be traced to a realization 
on the part of the Lutheran Laymen's 
League that its programs had to be pro-
duced specifically for radio. (154) 
Bravo! Trouble is. radio in 1971 is a different 
animal than she was in the '30's! 
John M. Culkin contributes an essay that 
is far and away the prize of the volume. \Vith 
patience, wit, and conviction, the Jesuit disci-
ple of McLuhan makes the case for the use of 
contemporary cinema by the churches as 
they go about the business of teaching. "It is 
the Alfies," he says, "which have to a degree 
become the teaching films" of today. And a 
great chunk of his essay shows "how-to-do-it," 
using La Strada as the example. 
The goals he seeks to meet are not so much 
specifically Christian communication as 
rather aid in tuning in on the humanum -
in cinema as in literature - so that men 
can "grow beyond what Piaget calls the ' I 
my. me' world of childhood to the freedom of 
maturity." (207) And. since "all the data isn't 
in on what it means to be a complete human 
being" (217). Culkin urges the churchman to 
tune in on the vast teaching machine of con-
temporary cinema for some indications of 
what that data includes. 
Of extreme value for the DCE on the prowl 
for materials is the example of "Perspectives 
on War: A Teaching Unit of Films," an exam-
ple of the kind of work being done under Cul-
kin 's direction at Fordham. A variety of short 
films are "programmed" to focus the issues in 
the unit, complete with commentary on the 
films and discussion-starters . A series of 
appendices lists film sources . children 's films . 
and an extensive bibliography both on cinema 
and on media in general . 
What the book says about the media is care-
ful. thorough , and terribly important, and 
must be helpful to "the churchman." But. like 
its predecessor, it fails to discharge the theo-
logian's task. Parker's monition to potential 
radio broadcasters should be turned around 
and used of churchly media-tors: 
Any religious spokesman who aspires to 
use radio successfully must undergo the 
discipline of becoming as much a pro-
fessional in broadcasting as he is in re-
ligion. (171) 
Unfortunately. this volume fails to add to the 
still meager evidence that the churches' media 
officers have the requisite professionalism 
in theology. 
DAVID G. TRUEMPER 
A Reader to Bring Talkers out of Watchers 
HOW TO TALK BACK TO YOUR TELE-
VISION SET. By Nicholas Johnson . Bos-
ton : Little, Brown and Company . 1969. 
$5 .75 . 
The battle of television goes on. But who 
a re the combatants? Is it Agnew and company 
versus Brinkley and cohorts? The videots ver-
sus the eggheads? Cartoon-addicts versus 
Sesame Street devotees? Private enterprise 
(network power structures) versus the public 
interest (but how much of the public is really 
in teres ted?)? 
Federal Communications Commission 
member Nicholas Johnson thinks the major 
battle is the last-named . between the "fat 
cat" network boards and the public interest . 
represented by the understaffed and under-
funded FCC. And in this collection of essays 
written since 1967 . he makes a pretty strong-
case for the weak side. seeking to document 
his contention that the " public interest" is 
being violated and corrupted by private 
enterprise in the persons of broadcast owners 
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and stockholders . 
The most significant essay, "The Media 
Barons and the Public Interest," introduces 
the reader to the problem of ownership of 
mass media operations, and to the repeatedly 
stymied efforts of the FCC to guard the public 
interest. In effect, Johnson claims , the FCC 
must do its job on the basis of an archaic char-
ter (the 1934 Communications Act). with an 
inadequate staff and budget, and in the face 
of opposition not only from a powerful broad-
casting lobby but also from a Congress per-
haps one-third of whose members themselves 
have financial interests in broadcasting oper-
ations. 
Another highly significant and controver-
sial issue raised several times by Johnson is 
that of censorship. Where would regulation 
in the public interest become governmental 
censorship? Can a regulatory agency like the 
FCC be strengthened without trampling on 
the freedom of speech and press? Johnson cer-
tainly wants a stronger FCC. and he thinks 
that censorship can be avoided with the help 
of a citizens' watchdog commission . Trouble 
is, nobody has yet fig-ured out how to make 
such a commission sufficiently prestigious 
that it can be effective! 
Johnson urges other kinds of " talk-back." 
from the forced realig-nment of the industry, 
to public access to the airwaves . to forced 
decentralization of programming control. to 
citizen involvement in hearings for license 
renewals. This latter item deserves special 
mention ; a station 's license must be renewed 
every three years . and the FCC must hear 
citizens' comments about how well the station 
has served the public interest in the pre-
ceding triennium . "Keep those cards and 
letters coming- in . . 
There are more fruitful ways of talking 
back to your television set than throwing an 
empty beer bottle at the tube. Johnson's book 
is one good source of suggestions . So read 
it - and talk back! 
DAVID G. TRUEMPER 
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Visual Arts Exhibition 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------ByRICHARD H.W. BRAUER 
LEFT: Albrecht Duerer, THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST, 1510. 
Woodcut, 15 3/ 8" x 11 ". Last of eleven woodcuts published in 1511 and called The Large Passion. 
National Gallery of Art, Rosenwald Collection. 
"In reality it fuses the Resurrection with the Ascension .... 
According to a scheme developed in Italy, but contrary to the Northern tradition 
to which Duerer adhered in his other prints of the resurrection, 
Christ is not represented standing on the ground or on the lid of the sarcophagus, 
much less in the very act of stepping out of the tomb; 
He is miraculously suspended above the grave .... 
The figure is set out against a 'neutral' background bordered by a band 
of radiant clouds which cuts into the gloom of nocturnal scenery." 
Erwin Panofsky 
Life and Art of Albrecht Duerer 
ABOVE: Abraham Rattner , THE LAST JUDGMENT, 1953-1956. Oil on canvas, three panels, 8' x 12'. The Downtown Gallery. Photograph by 
Geoffrey Clements . 
"The nightmare of Hiroshima-Nagasaki got me started - but the war was over -
no, the war was not over - no, the war j·s not over. 
Maybe it's the way of civilization to have the air filled with torment, anxieties, fears, doubts. 
Me and mine. You and yours. Always more, more, more. 
Do yon have to dominate? Do you have to be the largest, the greatest, the biggest, 
the best? Always on and on- to the inevitable violence, collision, war, the sinister end. 
Haunted by a nightmare, the vision stares at my silence. 
The painting became the interpretation of the final reality of the atom, 
the form and the color became the apocalyptic metaphors." 
A braham Rattner 
Quoted by Frank Getlein 
An Exhibition Booklet of The American Federation of Arts 
The Theatre 
Revivals Continued 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------By WALTER SORELL 
Last month I reported on several revivals, and it 
seems that this season is distinguishing itself as a season 
of classic and semi-classic plays. 
Claire Bloom added to her fine characterization of 
Nora in The Doll:r House an engrossing realization of 
Hedda in Hedda Gabler. Last June in London I saw 
Ingmar Bergman's cinematic stage version of the latter 
play with Maggie Smith as Hedda, and it was an unfor-
gettable experience. The production, however, was 
far more Bergman's concept of Hedda than Ibsen's . 
Patrick Garland's direction of Miss Bloom as Hedda 
brought forth a production which could have been staged 
by Ibsen himself. Miss Bloom creates this highly neu-
rotic and frigid woman with Ibsenesque clarity; the 
action of the play progresses with cold logic but beneath 
it is Hedda's underlying motivation of finding an emo-
tional meaning in life. The highlight of her perfor-
mance came with the burning of Lovborg's manuscript. 
With each gesture she showed her desperate disdain 
for life and hope, but equally as much her consuming 
jealousy, the daimon driving her toward self-destruction. 
Moliere's gentle comedy of human foibles , The 
School for Wives, received an enchanting rendering at 
the Phoenix Theater. The text was superbly translated 
by Richard Wilbur, and Stephen Porter directed the 
play with a superb cast. Porter has a way of giving 
Moliere the necessary touch of stylization without 
making us too much aware of the play as period piece. 
It stands and falls with the actor playing Arnolphe, 
and Brian Bedford displays rare understanding for 
Moliere. As Arnolphe, Bedford knows how to make a 
fool, who becomes the victim of his own scheming, 
appear utterly human. Arnolphe is constantly used as 
the confidant of his rival in love; this makes the part 
of Arnolphe a most demanding one, for the actor must 
let us know Arnolphe's feelings while they must be 
hidden from the rival. Bedford pulls it off delight-
fully . When The School for Wives was first produced, 
Moliere was attacked for having questioned the law 
that gave guardians absolute authority over minors; 
it only goeli to show that even so urbane a playwright 
as Moliere, who only wanted to entertain, can get into 
trouble. 
The theme of hope deferred is as old as the first man 
who began to grope for the meaning of human life. The 
realization that God may have forgotten man and man's 
plea to be recognized as the human being he is are 
dramatized in Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot. The 
characters are essentially symbolic reincarnations of 
Job, and their afflictions are indeterminately hidden 
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in living itself. The succession of little deaths creates 
the feeling of futility which creates the feeling of bore-
dom which creates the need for faith which creates the 
fortitude with which twentieth century Job hangs on, 
waiting without hope. 
Beckett's play has become a semi-classic by now after 
only sixteen years in existence. This proves, if nothing 
else, how fast we move nowhere. Alan Schneider gave 
this dramatization of life as a tragicomic vaudeville 
act the right tone of gallows humor, and there is in it 
the right feeling for the huge word symphony of tanta-
lizing gibberish with its frightful meaning. Waiting for 
Godot has become alive again in the Sheridan Square 
Playhouse. 
Peter Brook's staging of A Midsummer Night :r Dream 
is a lightyear away from any previous version of the 
play, particularly those versions evoking the spirit of 
Mendelssohn's music. I still remember the celebrated 
stage version done by Max Reinhardt when I was quite 
young, and I delighted with Reinhardt in the fact that 
the grass he used was real grass the the trees real trees. 
Brook asked his stage designer to create a theatrical 
space in which everything should be functional so that 
Brook could celebrate pure theatre, or rather theatri-
cality. 
He chose fireman's ladders instead of trees; the love 
juice is dispensed from a silver plate spinning on a 
juggler's stick; and a huge scarlet ostrich feather makes 
up the bed which Titania shares with Bottom. Oberon 
swings on a trapeze; Puck hangs on ropes and runs on 
stilts; and Bottom is transformed far more into a clown 
than an ass. 
A circus atmosphere in a commedia dell'arte style 
forces the actors to be acrobats and singers. There is an 
uninterrupted mingling of styles and ideas, and roles 
are doubled to unify all the lovers in a common dream. 
Illusions are enhanced by demystifying conventional 
concepts, and mockery mixes with surprise. All this 
results in the most imaginative and poetic Dream whose 
totality is as overwhelming as each of its parts. 
Not a single word of the Shakespearean text is omit-
ted or tampered with. Every line, spoken with the lilt 
of its most lyric value, comes across beautifully. The 
nonsensical parts of the mixed-up lovers suddenly make 
sense on that brightly lit stage and in a clinical atmos-
phere of circus tricks. "The lunatic, the lover, and the 
poet" are unified in the acrobat. And the acrobat is in 
fact a stage magician who lets us see all his tricks. This 
Dream creates the magic of true make-believe. If this is 
avant-garde theatre - I am all for it. 
The Cresset 
Editor-At-Large By .IOHN STIIIETELMEIEII 
Reflections of a Loyal Oppositionist 
I don't know why anybody should be interested in my 
views on the present turmoil within The Lutheran 
Church - Missouri Synod, but apparently there are 
those who are. So here , for whatever it may be worth , 
is the way my thinking runs. 
The Missouri Synod - any church body for that 
matter - as an institution falls within what Lutheran 
theologians have called the Kingdom of the Left Hand . 
It is a body politic with instruments and agencies not 
radically different from a government or a labor union 
or the United States Chamber of Commerce. Through 
these institutions and agencies it makes its decisions. 
That means that there is a political process at work, 
however much we may prefer to ignore it and ascribe 
our corporate decisions to the secret work of the Holy 
Spirit. (I am not denying that the Spirit may, indeed, 
motivate particular decisions , but He does so through 
the very human agency of politics, understood as a 
human invention for expediting the making of decisions .) 
As in all political bodies, there are parties within The 
Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod, corresponding very 
roughly to Right, Left, and Center. All of them claim to 
be rooted firmly in the Holy Scriptures and the Luth-
eran Confessions - and the sincerity of this claim may 
be readily granted. The operative fact is that they under-
stand the Scriptures and the Confessions differently, 
and no amount of papering over can conceal those dif-
ferences. So profound are these differences that it is 
difficult for any one of us to define the stance of those 
with whom he differs without reaching for some sort of 
invidious cliche. Thus Rightist, conservative, and fun-
damentalist have come to be synonymous in the voca-
bulary of some of us, while Leftist, liberal , and modern-
ist have come to be synonymous to others of us. 
For something like 25 years prior to 1969, The Luth-
eran Church - Missouri Synod was controlled by a colai-
tion of Liberals and Moderates under the presidencies 
of two great and widely-respected Moderates, Dr. John 
W. Behnken and Dr. Oliver R. Harms. Neither man had 
any great sympathy for the Liberal theological posi-
tion, but both apparently felt attracted to the open , 
live-and-let-live churchmanship of the Liberal party. 
I remember Dr. Behnken coming to Valparaiso and 
scolding those of us who talked about the age of the 
earth in terms of billions rather than thousands of 
years - and then having lunch with us in a spirit of 
good-fellowship. And I admired him for his capacity 
to switch roles so completely from that of the Grand 
Inquisitor, which was assigned to him by the Synodical 
constitution and which he did not hesitate to play, to 
that of the kindly and genial reverend father in God 
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who seldom tried to hurry the converting and enlight-
ening work of the Holy Spirit. 
These years of Liberal ascendancy ended suddenly 
and decisively at the Synodical convention in Denver 
in the summer of 1969. Against all precedent, a Moder-
ate incumbent president who was still in the vigor of 
his sixties was turned out of office and a young Conser-
vative was elected to succeed him. So much is, I believe, 
factual. What follows is my own interpretation of events. 
Having come to power, the Conservative party did 
what the Liberals had done a generation before. They 
consolidated their power and began to divide the spoils. 
(If anyone is offended by these images from the secular 
political world , I would suggest that it is just because 
we fail to recognize the similarity of operations in all 
human institutions that we handle transfers of power 
so badly within the church.) The national laymen's asso-
ciation had been taken over even before the Denver 
convention. After that convention the publications be-
came a prime target. Once they had been taken over or 
neutralized, the time had come for the big move -
against Concordia Seminary. 
I share with my fellow Liberals a feeling of resentment 
that what our party might justifiably consider its best 
gift to the church - the Seminary in its present form -
should now be under attack from men who, we suspect, 
have no idea of the amount of labor and dedication that 
went into the building of that place. But in our more 
thoughtful moments, we realize that this move is con-
sistant with the conscious policy of the Conservatives 
and with what a great many Moderates, possibly unwit-
tingly, voted for when they brought the present Syn-
odical administration to office. 
What I do not share with my fellow Liberals is the 
feeling that there is anything evil or underhanded in 
the move against the Seminary. I expect the Conser-
vatives to act as conservatives; indeed I would feel that 
they had deceived the church if they did not. Our task 
as Liberals, forming a loyal opposition, is not, therefore, 
to condemn them, but to oppose them. 
Our task as Liberals is a task of churchmanship, which 
is to say, of politics. If we truly believe that our poli-
cies are in the best interest of the church and of those 
larger purposes which the church serves, it is our re-
sponsibility to regain power. And the way to do that is 
to re-establish the coalition between Liberals and Mod-
erates which for so long, as I think, served the church 
well and which, in my judgment, foundered at Denver 
because we Liberals were either unwilling or unable to 




Another ''End of Innocence" 
By JOHN KRETZMANN 
"Social revolutions are a compromise between utopia and historical 
reality . Leszek Kolakowski 
All Power to the Imagination . Young Peoples' Slogan 
In my February column on this page I attempted to 
outline some of the causes of what appears to be a rather 
widespread disillusionment with colleges and univer-
sities, and to point to some possible remedies for this 
state of affairs. Since the basic argument seemed quite 
clear to me, I was surprised to note my father's deci-
sion in his March column to print a vigorous rebuttal 
-shattering the well-plotted sequence of our exchanges. 
But boggled was my mind quadruply when I discov-
ered that the substance of his "rebuttal" was based 
upon approving quotations from the very column he 
purported to be ripping to shreds. Ah, Dr. Freud, is 
there some explanation for this basic drive which sets 
fathers in eternal rebellion against their sons? 
At any rate, my father's decision has freed me to 
open up a new line of inquiry here. I want to begin to 
isolate what is possibly a central defect in the American 
left, in all of its attempts to build sustained movements 
for social change. The defect involves a curious vacil-
lation in the collective psychology - in the mood - of 
people seriously committed to social change. It is a kind 
of "pendulum syndrome" which contributes directly to 
the maintainance of systems of privilege and the status 
quo in our society. 
The poles between which the pendulum swings may 
be variously described: a Christian might refer to them 
as "faith" and "reason," a poet as "imagination" and 
"reality," a Marxian scholar as "utopianism" and "ra-
tionalism. "Yet no matter which set of terms one chooses to 
deal with, it is clear that each pole carries with it a distinct 
and comprehensive set of assumptions about the world 
one lives in , investing that world with either frighten-
ing powers of limitation or infinite possibilities and 
opportunities. 
It is perhaps typical of single-minded America that 
she has not been able to produce a sustained movement 
for social change, one which would necessarily have its 
foundation in the ambiguous and dialectical ground 
which lies between these poles. 
One need not look back into history too far to find 
ample evidence of the pendulum syndrome. In his 
controversial coda for the left, published in 1955, Les-
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"All the tmmbets sounded (or him on the other side" 
PILGRIM's PROGRESS 
lie Fiedler argued that An End to Innocence was a good 
thing, that a left based upon foreign models and leader-
ship, especially discredited models and leadership, was 
fundamentally dishonest and irrelevant. The rug had 
been pulled out from under the vision and the vision 
disintegrated. But the deflation of Fiedler's version of 
innocence led, in reaction, to the largely uncritical 
acceptance of a Realpolitik world whose boundaries were 
described by a simplistic Cold War reading of reality. 
Disillusioned and frustrated, the left melted into the 
pragmatic American mainstream. 
Yet already a swing back to the opposite pole was 
stirring in the wings. It was partly out of a frustration at 
the restrictive nature of a timid realism that a "new" 
left emerged . And we can begin now to see that the six-
ties were marked by the rebirth of a wide variety of forms 
of innocence. 
Certainly this was an innocence born of unbounded 
good will, active imaginations, lofty intentions - and 
an almost defiantly naive reading of political reality. 
Wars would end when good people refused to fight in 
them. Racism would disappear when good people eli-
minated their own prejudices. Ugly cities would be re-
placed by communities built with bright colors and 
love. One could, in short, rebuild a society by rebuild-
ing one's own life. That the vision , the imagination 
of the sixties was fundamentally personalistic rather 
than collective may help to explain both its widespread 
attractiveness and its probable evanescence. 
For now, as anyone listening to the messages from cam-
puses and communities can report, a very different mood 
is upon us. The pendulum swings back once again , as 
innocence and imagination are buried under a kind of 
sobering severity. That tender faith which held that 
even politics was love has been smothered by the dis-
turbing recognition that, in reality, even love is politics . 
This new realism , this current version of an "end to 
innocence," seems to have presented many of our most 
sensitive young people with a collective emotional 
crisis of truly frightening depths. They have perceived 
the web of institutionalized inhumanity tightening 
about us all , and the perception has driven some into a 
stance of extreme privatism and despair. In a world 
where politics was love, where were the limitations ? 
But in a world where love is politics, where are the 
possibilities? That, at the moment, is our dilemma. 
Next month, perhaps, my father will lead into our 
last topic - in which we will offer our separate hopes for 
imagination, for faith, for new life, for the future of man. 
The Cresset 
